Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 13
Number 2 2020

Article 2

12-30-2020

Interpreting the Conditions for Imprévision: The Goals of the
Reform Projects as a Decisive Tool for French and Belgian Courts
Luigi Montefusco

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons

Repository Citation
Luigi Montefusco, Interpreting the Conditions for Imprévision: The Goals of the Reform Projects as a
Decisive Tool for French and Belgian Courts, 13 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2020)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol13/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

INTERPRETING THE CONDITIONS FOR IMPRÉVISION: THE
GOALS OF THE REFORM PROJECTS AS A DECISIVE TOOL
FOR FRENCH AND BELGIAN COURTS
Luigi Montefusco∗
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 195
II. The Evolution of the Doctrine of Imprévision from the Code
Napoléon to the Reform Projects of the French and Belgian
Civil Codes ............................................................................. 200
A. The Historical Resistance to Imprévision in France and
Belgium ................................................................................... 200
B. The Slow Erosion of the Principle of the Binding Force of
the Contract: The Attempts of the Legislator, Scholars, and
Courts ...................................................................................... 203
C. The Regulation of Imprévision Under the New Article
1195 and Draft Article 5.77 .................................................... 210
III. The Introduction of Imprévision in Light of the Goal of
Modernisation ........................................................................ 213
A. Modernisation Through Harmonisation ........................ 216
B. Modernisation as the Reflection of the Interests of
Commercial Parties ................................................................. 218
IV. The Introduction of Imprévision in Light of the Goal of Legal
Certainty ................................................................................. 221
A. The Disputed Meaning of “Legal Certainty” ................ 221
B. Time of the Change of Circumstances .......................... 223
C. Manifestations of Imprévision ....................................... 224
D. Excessive Onerousness of the Performance .................. 225
E. Unforeseeability of the Event ........................................ 227
V. The Introduction of Imprévision in Light of the Goal of
Contractual Justice ................................................................. 230
A. The Meaning of Contractual Justice ............................. 230
B. The Contrast Between a Narrow Interpretation of the
Requirements and the Goal of Contractual Justice ................. 233

194

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

1. Time of the Change of Circumstances: The Relationship
Between the Doctrine of Imprévision and the Doctrine of
Mistake ........................................................................... 233
2. Manifestations of Imprévision ........................................ 237
3. Unforeseeability of the Event ......................................... 238
C. The Contrast Between a Broad Interpretation of the
Requirements and the Goal of Contractual Justice ................. 241
1. Hardship Situations Attributable to the Aggrieved Party 241
2. Excessive Onerousness of the Performance Measured
Against the Subjective Conditions of the Aggrieved Party
........................................................................................ 242
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................ 246

ABSTRACT
The codification of the doctrine of imprévision in France and its
codification attempt in Belgium is a significant turning point given
the historical resistance in both countries towards it. Nevertheless,
the fact that the French and Belgian civil codes had remained silent
on the issue for more than 200 years poses problems of interpretation, in particular, with the regard to requirements to be met in order to trigger imprévision as set forth by new Article 1195 of the
French Civil Code and Draft Article 5.77 of Belgian legislative proposal No. 3709/1 of April 3, 2019. In the absence of a well-established line of cases on the doctrine of imprévision, French and Belgian courts might, however, endeavour to interpret the requirements
for imprévision by analysing it in light of the goals shared by the
French and Belgian reform projects, namely modernisation, legal
certainty and contractual justice. The purpose of this research is to
assess the requirements for imprévision in light of the objectives set
by the legislators, in order to recommend a possible interpretation
of those requirements by French and Belgian courts.
Keywords: France, Belgium, imprévision, hardship, art. 1195, draft
article 5.77, modernisation, legal certainty, contractual justice
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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to become more appealing to foreign companies, more
and more often national legislators aim to create a “businessfriendly” legal environment 1 by making significant changes to their
civil or commercial codes. In this respect, comparative law plays a
key role. It is a source of inspiration for legislators, who are pushed
by globalised and interconnected markets to introduce juridical values into their national legal systems to which they do not traditionally belong. 2
Along the same lines, France and Belgium perceived the need to
update their law of obligations, 3 including the introduction of the
long-awaited doctrine of imprévision 4 within their respective civil
∗ Trainee Lawyer, BonelliErede; LL.M. in International Trade and Investment Law, Maastricht University; LL.M. in Law, Università di Napoli Federico
II. The author would like to thank Alexandru-Daniel On for his support and thorough supervision and Professor Olivier Moréteau for his valuable comments.
1. However, a “business-friendly” legal environment is an essential but insufficient condition. See CCI Paris Ile de France, Droit des affaires : enjeux d’attractivité internationale et de souveraineté (2015), https://perma.cc/EDM6U5MH.
2. E. Ciongaru, Influence of globalisation on the law systems, 8 AGORA
INT’L J. JURID. SCI. 24 (2014).
3. The need for modernisation of French contract law was perceived especially after the publication of the Doing Business reports by the World Bank between 2004 and 2006. These documents highlighted the drawbacks of French contract law with regards to its effects on business. France was only ranked fortyfourth for ease of doing business, since French law was considered economically
inefficient, complex, unpredictable, and not being very attractive as opposed to
common law systems. These reports had the effect of “electroshocks” to the
French legal community. The initial reaction from French scholars was highly
critical, in particular for what concerns the methodology employed by the World
Bank in ranking the different legal systems. Nevertheless, these reports were also
constructive, as they sparked a public debate in France about the economic efficiency of law and, as proved by their direct reference within the Report to the
President of the Republic accompanying the reform project, played a role in the
modernisation of the French Civil Code. For the reaction of the French legal community, see ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT DES AMIS DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE
FRANÇAISE, 1 LES DROITS DE TRADITION CIVILISTE EN QUESTION : À PROPOS DES
RAPPORTS DOING BUSINESS DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE (SLC 2006); B. FauvarqueCosson & A. J. Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to
the Doing Business World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law,
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 811 (2009).
4. According to the French doctrinal literature, the theory of imprévision
(often defined as “hardship” in common law jurisdictions) is the theory of
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codes. In France, this desire for reform resulted in Ordinance no.
2016-131 of February 10, 2016, 5 which enshrined the doctrine of
imprévision in the new article 1195 of the Civil Code. In Belgium,
it resulted in legislative proposal no. 3709/1 of 3 April 2019 6 (which
is yet to be approved by the Parliament) to insert Book 5 “Obligations” into the new Civil Code, including draft article 5.77 on imprévision.
On the one hand, the introduction of articles expressly regulating
changed circumstances in the French and—if the reform project is
approved—the Belgian civil codes is to be welcomed, as these two
bodies of laws had remained silent on the issue for more than 200
years. On the other hand, the absence of a well-established line of
cases on this legal issue calls for a hermeneutic effort from French
and Belgian courts, especially in the interpretation of the several
conditions triggering imprévision under article 1195 and draft article
5.77. French and Belgian judges might, however, endeavour to
changed circumstances: it refers to situations where performance of the contract
becomes extremely difficult or much more onerous, without being impossible, as
a result of unforeseeable circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, which disrupt the balance of the contract. See, on this point, J. GHESTIN ET
AL., TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL : LES EFFETS DU CONTRAT 310-311 (L.G.D.J. 1994);
P. Ancel, Imprévision, 1 RÉP. DE DR. CIV. 1 (2017). In such scenarios, judges are
granted the power to intervene in the contractual sphere in order to provide the
aggrieved party with a contractual remedy to cope with the unforeseeable circumstance. This intervention may take the form of renegotiations imposed upon the
parties, revision of the contract, or termination.
Common law jurisdictions deal with changed circumstances under the doctrine of
“frustration of purpose”: frustration occurs when, due to an unforeseen event, performance of the contract produces a radically different result from what the parties
anticipated when the contract was signed; however, unlike the doctrine of imprévision, this doctrine does not allow for renegotiation and judicial revision of the
contract. It only allows for its termination.
5. Ordonnance no. 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit
des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations, JORF no. 0035,
Feb. 11, 2016. The ordinance came into force on Oct. 1, 2016. As required, it was
ratified by the parliament through Act no. 2018-287, Apr. 20, 2018, JORF no.
0093, Apr. 21, 2018, which entered into force on Oct. 1, 2018 [hereinafter, the
French Revision of 2016].
6. Proposition de loi portant insertion du livre 5 “Les obligations” dans le
nouveau Code civil, no. 3709/001, Chambre, 6e session de la 54e législature (Proposition de loi, no. 3709/001) [hereinafter, the Belgian Draft of 2019],
https://perma.cc/FD9Q-83JZ.
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interpret the requirements for imprévision by analysing it in light of
the goals of the reform projects. Indeed, the French and Belgian reforms are driven by the same goals of modernisation, legal certainty,
and contractual justice. 7
Both countries intended to modernise their civil codes through a
comparative look at foreign law and international and European projects for the harmonisation of the law of contract, particularly the
Principles of European Contract Law, 8 the Draft European Common
Frame of Reference 9 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts. 10 With regard to imprévision, the internal resistance to this doctrine caused France and Belgium to be the main
exceptions to a well-established trend in Europe towards the recognition of the duty to renegotiate and the possibility for the courts to
adapt the contract in the event of changed circumstances. 11 The legislators of both countries acknowledged this isolation from the rest
of Europe and presented it as one of the reasons to modernise their
civil codes by welcoming the theory of imprévision. Indeed, in the
Report to the President of the Republic, it is stated that “France is
one of the last countries in Europe not to recognize the theory of
imprévision as a moderating cause of the binding force of the contract.” 12 Similarly, the Belgian Draft of 2019 highlights that this

7. For France, see Rapport au Président de la République relatif à l’ordonnance no. 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du
régime général et de la preuve des obligations, JORF no. 0035, Feb. 11, 2016
[hereinafter Rapport au Président]; for Belgium, see Belgian Draft of 2019, supra
note 6.
8. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (2010) [hereinafter, PECL].
9. DRAFT EUROPEAN COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (Sellier 2009) [hereinafter, DCFR].
10. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts [hereinafter, PICC].
11. R. M. URIBE, THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE
BINDING FORCE OF CONTRACTS 191 (Intersentia 2011).
12. Rapport au Président, supra note 7: “La France est l’un des derniers pays
d’Europe à ne pas reconnaître la théorie de l'imprévision comme cause modératrice de la force obligatoire du contrat.”
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juridical concept is present in all modern legislations and the abovementioned harmonisation projects. 13
Updating the Civil Code was also necessary to provide legal certainty, the main issue being the development of French and Belgian
civil law outside their respective civil codes. As for France, the legislator acknowledged that “the current texts do not allow for an understanding of positive law, as the courts have had to interpret them,
by analogy, a contrario, or even contra legem.” 14 However, “jurisprudence is inherently fluid, and does not provide the legal certainty
which only a written law can offer.” 15 The Belgian Draft of 2019 is
also aimed at “improving legal certainty,” 16 considering that it is no
longer possible to claim that “positive law, as it is applied in practice, is found within the Code.” 17 This is particularly visible in the
above-mentioned draft article 5.77, where the inclusion of a provision on imprévision is justified by the need to establish sécurité juridique with regard to the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation,
which tends to accept it gradually. 18 It is evident that the French and
Belgian legislators feared the confusion created by the numerous
judgements interpreting, and sometimes contradicting, the wording
of their civil codes, and therefore decided to enact clear rules to prevent the creation of law outside of them. 19
13. See Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art.
5.77.
14. Rapport au Président, supra note 7: “les textes actuels ne permettent pas
d’appréhender le droit positif, tant la jurisprudence a dû les interpréter, par analogie, a contrario, voire contra legem.”
15. See id.: “la jurisprudence est par essence fluctuante, et ne permet pas d’assurer la sécurité juridique que seul peut offrir un droit écrit.”
16. See Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Resumé.
17. See id., Introduction: “on ne peut plus prétendre que le droit positif, tel
qu’il est appliqué dans la pratique actuelle, se trouve dans le Code.”
18. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art. 5.77.
19. For France, see S. Rowan, The New French Law of Contract, 66 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 807-808 (2017): “To read the Civil Code therefore did not give a clear
or precise picture of the French law of contract”; for Belgium, see P. Wéry, Mutations et défis du nouveau droit belge des obligations, 60 REVUE DE LA FACULTÉ
DE DROIT DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE LIÈGE 223 (2015), where the author refers to the
Belgian Civil Code in these terms: “La façade de l’édifice n’est toutefois plus
qu’un trompe-l’œil. Les pièces intérieures et le mobilier ont été rénovés en profondeur par la doctrine et la jurisprudence.”
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Regarding contractual justice, this is an overall goal of the reforms on the law of obligations, which can also be identified, among
others, in the provisions on imprévision. 20 The introduction of the
theory of imprévision is intended to promote contractual fairness, 21
by allowing courts to correct serious contractual imbalances that
arise during its execution. The proliferation of long-term contracts
has posed problems in this respect. These contracts are more likely
to be affected by the instability of economic conditions over time. 22
In the absence of code provisions allowing for contract termination
and/or adaptation, commercial parties who did not include specific
clauses regulating the case of supervening circumstances into their
contract bear the risk “to be stuck with 300-year-old contract terms
stipulating prices in a currency that had long ceased to exist.” 23
The purpose of this research is to provide a critical analysis of
the requirements triggering imprévision under the new article 1195
of the French Civil Code and draft article 5.77 of the Belgian Draft
of 2019, in light of the objectives set by the legislators. The following section will introduce the juridical context preceding the French
and Belgian reform of the law of contract, a context of resistance
and sometimes outright rejection of the doctrine of imprévision
(Section II). Then, the article will look into the conditions for
20. For France, see the Rapport au Président, supra note 7, which refers to
the justice contractuelle as an explicit objective of the French Revision of 2016.
The Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, although not specifically, does the same
by stating the goal of modernising “the balance between party autonomy and the
role of the judge as guardian of the interests of the weaker party. . . .” (author’s
translation). The latter goal is pursued, among others, by allowing courts to adapt
the contract in the event of changed circumstances (Draft art. 5.77). Moreover,
Draft art. 5.77 is inspired by French law, where the inclusion of the power of
courts to adapt the contract is justified on grounds of contractual fairness.
21. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7; see also D. Philippe, L’introduction de l’imprévision en droit belge, in HET BURGERLIJK RECHT IN BEWEGING / LE
DROIT CIVIL EN MOUVEMENT : JAARBOEK DAG VAN DE BEDRIJFSJURIST 2018 - ANNUAIRE JOURNÉE DU JURISTE D’ENTREPRISE 2018 (M. Beyens ed., Uitgeverij Larcier 2018).
22. Rowan, supra note 19, at 820.
23. T. Lutzi, Introducing Imprévision into French Contract Law: A Paradigm
Shift in Comparative Perspective, in THE FRENCH CONTRACT LAW REFORM: A
SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? 98 (S. Stijns & S. Jansen eds., Intersentia 2016).
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imprévision, which will be assessed in relation to the above-mentioned goals of modernisation (Section III), legal certainty (Section
IV) and contractual justice (Section V), respectively. This analysis
will be then followed by a conclusion on the recommended interpretation of those requirements by French and Belgian courts.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPRÉVISION FROM THE
CODE NAPOLÉON TO THE REFORM PROJECTS OF THE FRENCH AND
BELGIAN CIVIL CODES
A. The Historical Resistance to Imprévision in France and Belgium
After the publication of the Code Napoléon in 1804, French
courts adopted different approaches towards imprévision. On the
one hand, administrative courts have been more open, as they have
recognised the possibility to grant relief to parties affected by
changed circumstances. 24 On the other hand, the openness of administrative courts has been countered with the rejection of this doctrine
by civil courts. Furthermore, within the latter, the more lenient approach of lower courts has been strongly opposed and overturned by
the Cour de cassation. 25
Administrative courts started to consider changed circumstances
as of the famous judgement rendered by the Conseil d’Etat in the
Gaz de Bordeaux case of 1916. 26 The court considered the price increase affecting a concession contract to be exceptional and therefore granted partial indemnity to the aggrieved party, in order to ensure the continuity of public services. 27 Even though the remedy was
not the adaptation of the contract, this judgement laid the foundation

24. E. HONDIUS & C. GRIGOLEIT, UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROCONTRACT LAW 147 (Cambridge U. Press 2011); Ancel, supra note 4, at
para. 18.
25. HONDIUS & GRIGOLEIT, supra note 24, at 147-48.
26. CE 30 Mar.1916, Cie générale d’éclairage de Bordeaux c/ Ville de Bordeaux, Rec. Lebon 59928.
27. HONDIUS & GRIGOLEIT, supra note 24, at 147.
PEAN
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for the power of administrative judges to remedy unforeseen circumstances. 28
On the civil side, the silence of the Code Napoléon (and of its
preparatory works) on the impact of changed circumstances on the
contract urged civil courts to clarify the question. 29 Despite the attempts of some lower courts to revise contracts whose balance had
been disrupted, 30 the Cour de cassation repeatedly denied this possibility.31 The rejection of the theory of imprévision was explicit in
the Canal de Craponne case of 1876, where the Cour de cassation
stated that “under no circumstances is it for the courts, however fair
their decision may appear to them to be, to take into account the time
and the circumstances in order to substitute new terms for those
which have been freely accepted by the contracting parties.” 32 The
decision was grounded in the principle of the binding force of the
contract enshrined in the then article 1134 of the French Civil Code
(now article 1103 33). This article embodies the principle of pacta
28. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 18. The Conseil d’État confirmed this position in its future jurisprudence, where it also specified the conditions of application: CE 8 Feb. 1918, Sté d’éclairage de Poissy, RD publ. 1918.244, concl. Corneille; CE 27 June 1919, Sté du gaz et de l’électricité de Nice c/ Ville de Nice, S.
1920.3.25, note M. Hauriou; CE 3 Dec. 1920, Fromassol, RD publ. 1921.80,
concl. Corneille; CE 25 Nov. 1921, Cie générale des automobiles postales c/ État,
S. 1923.3.33, note M. Hauriou; CE 25 Nov. 1921; 2 Mar. 1923; Feb. 29, Mar. 28,
Jun. 18 and Aug. 8, 1924 ; Jan. 23, 1925, DP 1925.3.17, note Closset; CE May 8,
1925, Compagnies réunies de gaz et d’électricité c/ Ville de Bordeaux; CE Mar.
27, 1926, Ville de Montfort-l’Amaury, DP 1927.3.17, note Closset; CE Dec. 9,
1932, Cie des tramways de Cherbourg, DP 1933.3.17, note Pelloux; CE 22 June
1934, Cie continentale du gaz, DH 1934.448.
29. Id.
30. Rouen, 9 Feb. 1844, DP 1845. 2. 4; Douai, 3 May 1851, DP 1854. 2. 130;
Grenoble, 18 Aug. 1854, PD 1855. 2. 78; Paris, 26 May 1854, three judgements,
DP 1854. 2. 129; Rouen, 3 June 1854, DP 1854. 2. 131.
31. Cass. Civ., 9 Jan. 1856, PD 1856.1.33, seven judgments; Cass. Civ., 14
May 1872, S. 1873.1.224; Cass. Civ., 24 Mar.1874, S. 1874.1.429. Although these
judgements do not reject in principle the theory of imprévision, they do it implicitly by refusing to revise the contract due to events making performance more
onerous, on the assumption that these events fall short of constituting a situation
of force majeure, and therefore cannot be taken into account.
32. Cass. Civ., Mar. 6, 1876, Canal de Craponne, D. 1876.1.193, available
in English at H. G. BEALE ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONTRACT
LAW 1131 (Hart Publ’g 2010).
33. “Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont
faits.”

202

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

sunt servanda, according to which legally formed agreements have
the force of law between the parties, who must respect them and
abide by whatever has been promised in them. 34 It is believed that
the drafters of the Civil Code, given the historical precedents, could
not have disregarded the issue, and deliberately refrained from allowing any exception to article 1134. 35 The Cour de cassation has
been uncompromising in rejecting imprévision at least until the early
1990s. 36 French scholars, in turn, had not yet analysed the question
of hardship at the time of this judgement, as the term imprévision is
not found in the works of any commentator. 37 This is evidenced by
the fact that the Canal de Craponne case did not arouse attention
among scholars, until the aftermath of World War I. 38
In Belgium, the history of the judicial and doctrinal developments of the theory of imprévision is very similar to the French
one. 39 Unlike France, in Belgium there is no recognition of this theory in administrative cases, as the Conseil d’État is not competent
to deal with public contracts. 40 However, the Cour de cassation has
recognised that some form of the theory of imprévision applies to
public procurement contracts. 41 On the other hand, just like in
34. Rowan, supra note 19, at 813; H. van Houtte, Changed Circumstances
and Pacta Sunt Servanda, in TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 107-109 (E. Gaillard ed., ICC Publ. 1993).
35. J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL. LES BIENS. LES OBLIGATIONS 1075 (PUF
2004).
36. Ancel, supra note 4, at paras. 24-25. Cass. Civ., 15 Nov. 1933, Gaz. Pal.
1934.1.68; Cass. Com., 18 Jan. 1950, D. 1950.227; Cass. Soc., 8 March 1972, no.
71-40.429, D. 1972.340; Cass. Com., 18 Dec. 1979, no. 78-10.763, Bull. civ. IV,
no. 339; Cass. Civ. 3, 14 Oct. 1987, no. 85-18.132, Bull. civ. III, no. 169.
37. Ancel, supra note 4, at paras. 14 and 16. Changed circumstances are analysed, yet without mentioning the term imprévision, only by Larombière. See L.
LAROMBIÈRE, 4 THÉORIE ET PRATIQUE DES OBLIGATIONS, OU COMMENTAIRE DES
TITRES III ET IV, LIVRE III DU CODE CIVIL, ART. 1101 À 1386 (Pedone-Lauriel
1885).
38. Id. at para. 16.
39. HONDIUS & C. GRIGOLEIT, supra note 24, at 156.
40. Id. at 157.
41. P. VAN OMMESLAGHE & H. DE PAGE, 2 TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL BELGE :
LES OBLIGATIONS 824 (Bruylant 2013). However, while in France the doctrine has
been recognised autonomously by administrative courts, in Belgium the decision
of the Cour de cassation was based on the general terms on public works; J.
HERBOTS, CONTRACT LAW IN BELGIUM 185 (Kluwer 1995).
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France, the absence of civil code provisions taking into account
changed circumstances led the Belgian Cour de cassation to reject
the possibility for courts to revise the contract in the event of hardship, based on the principle of the binding force of the contract enshrined in article 1134 42 of the Belgian Civil Code. 43 The majority
of Belgian doctrine has traditionally supported the Cour de cassation in the rejection of the doctrine of imprévision. 44 However, a
movement in favour of its acceptance was formed around the
1980s. 45 Despite the development of this doctrinal trend, the Cour
de cassation has maintained, in principle, its position. 46
B. The Slow Erosion of the Principle of the Binding Force of the
Contract: The Attempts of the Legislator, Scholars, and Courts
While the French and the Belgian courts of cassation insisted on
the binding force of the contract to oppose the judicial revision in
case of unforeseen changed circumstances, some exceptions to this

42. “Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les
ont faites.”
43. Cass., 19 May 1921, Pas. 1921, I, 380; Cass., 30 Oct. 1924, Pas. 1924, I,
565. In these two judgements the Cour de cassation made clear that the revision
of the contract was possible only when envisaged by the law (in that case, Law of
Oct. 11, 1919). The rejection in principle of the theory of imprévision is found in
Cass., 14 Apr. 1994, Pas. 1994, I, 365; Cass., 20 Apr. 2006, Pas., 2006, 884. See
VAN OMMESLAGHE & DE PAGE, supra note 41, at 818; C. Biquet-Mathieu, Propos
sur l’imprévision : l’arrét Scafom international et son contexte belge, européen
et international, in MÉLANGES JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN 212-213 (B. Moore ed.,
Editions Yvon Blais 2012).
44. VAN OMMESLAGHE & DE PAGE, supra note 41, at 823-824; P. DE HARVEN, MOUVEMENTS GÉNÉRAUX DU DROIT CIVIL BELGE CONTEMPORAIN: ÉTUDE
CRITIQUE 231 (Bruylant 1928); C. Renard, La théorie de l’imprévision dans les
contrats, 2 REV. DR. INT. COMP. 17 (1950); Y. Hannequart, La portée du contrat,
in 4 LES NOVELLES, DROIT CIVIL 52 (Larcier 1958); X. Dieux, Réflexions sur la
force obligatoire des contrats et sur la théorie de l’imprévision en droit privé,
REV. CRIT. JUR. BELGE 386 (1983); J. Perilleux, La bonne foi dans l’exécution du
contrat. Rapport belge, in ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT, LA BONNE FOI 237 (Litec 1994); C. Delforge, La modification unilatérale du contrat, in LA VOLONTÉ
UNILATÉRALE DANS LE CONTRAT 139 (P. Van Ommeslaghe & J. F. Germain eds.,
Larcier 2008).
45. VAN OMMESLAGHE & DE PAGE, supra note 41.
46. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 36.
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principle were established first in special legislation, then in scholarly writings, and finally in court decisions.
The French and the Belgian legislators intervened with a series
of temporary measures in order to cope with the economic upheavals
caused primarily by the world wars. Courts could terminate specific
contracts concluded before or during the war, provided that the performance had become too onerous for one of the parties. 47 In the
same context, the legislators of both countries went so far as to grant
courts the power to revise contracts in specific situations. 48 Together
with these temporary measures, permanent legislation was enacted
to allow for the judicial revision of contracts in various sectors,
among others, lease contracts, 49 divorce, 50 copyright, 51 and public
works. 52 These provisions demonstrate the lawmakers’ will to create
exceptions to the principle of the sanctity of contracts, in order to
assist certain categories of contractors whose situation is seriously
unbalanced as a result of major changes in society. 53
47. For France, see Act of Jan. 21, 1918, Loi Faillot, (DP 1918.4.261). Similarly, after World War II, Act no. 49-547 of Apr. 22, 1949, D.1949.241, allowed
for the termination of successive delivery contracts concluded before Sept. 2,
1939, the execution of which would have generated new expenses for the debtor,
due to the war or the new economic circumstances, exceeding by far what could
have been expected at the time of the conclusion of the contract. For Belgium, see
Act of Oct. 11, 1919, Moniteur belge, Oct. 20, 1919.
48. Particularly, in France judges could delay payment terms (Law of June
29, 1935, DP 1935.4.313) or review the capital and interest terms of the purchaser’s debt (Law of July 17, 1937, DP 1938.4.113). For the temporary measures
taken, since the 1960s, in favour of repatriated French nationals, see Ancel, supra
note 4, at para. 28. For Belgium, Act of Oct. 11, 1919, unlike the Loi Faillot,
empowered courts not only to terminate, but also to revise contracts concluded
before WWI.
49. For Belgium, see art. 7 of the Law of Feb. 16, 1991 on residential leases;
art. 6 of the Law of Apr. 30, 1951 on commercial leases; arts. 17 et seq. of the
Law of Nov. 4, 1969 on leases and leased property. For France see decree no. 53960 of Sept. 30, 1953 on commercial leases; art. 17 et seq. Act no. 89-462 of July
6, 1989 on residential leases.
50. For Belgium see art. 1288 Judicial Code; for France see art. 276 Civil
Code.
51. For France see art. 37 of the Act of Mar. 11, 1957 on Copyright (L.1315 Code of Intellectual Property).
52. For Belgium see art. 16 Cahier général des charges des marchés publics
de travaux.
53. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 28; E. HONDIUS & C. GRIGOLEIT, supra note
24, at 146-147.
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The economic upheavals caused by World War I (shortage of
raw materials, increased prices, and the scarcity of male labour) also
had the effect of sparking the doctrinal debate among civilian scholars with regard to the question of imprévision. 54 They started questioning the destiny of those contracts whose performance had been
made more difficult as a result of the events mentioned. In France,
there was an initial trend 55 in favour of the contractual revision by
courts and against the rigidity of the contract, based on different legal grounds. 56 Later, a doctrinal movement, in line with the solutions
offered by the above-mentioned cases, strongly rejected the theory
on grounds of inviolability of the principle pacta sunt servanda. 57
However, as of the late 1980s, there is a re-emergence of post-WWI
ideas in the French civil doctrine. The reappraisal of the theory of
imprévision is due to considerations of solidarity and contractual
justice 58: the key is the third paragraph of (the then) article 1134 of
the French Civil Code, which imposes on the parties a duty to perform agreements in good faith and which would justify the judicial
54. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 17.
55. A. LOUVEAU, THÉORIE DE L’IMPRÉVISION EN DROIT CIVIL ET EN DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (Impr. de F. Simon 1920); L. FYOT, ESSAI D’UNE JUSTIFICATION
NOUVELLE DE LA THÉORIE DE L’IMPRÉVISION À L’ÉGARD DES CONTRATS PORTANT
SUR DES OBJETS AUTRES QU’UNE SOMME D’ARGENT (Impr. veuve Paul Berthier
1921); P. VOIRIN, DE L’IMPRÉVISION DANS LES RAPPORTS DE DROIT PRIVÉ (Ancienne impr. Vagner 1922); A. BRUZIN, ESSAI SUR LA NOTION D’IMPRÉVISION ET
SUR SON RÔLE EN MATIÈRE CONTRACTUELLE (Impr. J. Prély 1922); J. E. GUEULETTE, DES EFFETS JURIDIQUES DE LA GUERRE SUR LES CONTRATS (Jouve 1918);
J. RADOUANT, DU CAS FORTUIT ET DE LA FORCE MAJEURE (Rousseau 1920); S.
Serbesco, Effets de la guerre sur l’exécution des contrats, RTD CIV. 329 (1917);
L. JOSSERAND, DE L’ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITÉ (Dalloz 1927).
56. Fyot assimilates the situation in which a party cannot perform as a result
of unforeseeable circumstances to the position of the non-performing debtor in
good faith under art. 1150 Civ. Code, which can be ordered to compensate the
creditor, only up to the limit of the foreseeable damages; Josserand refers instead
to implicit will of the parties not to bear the negative consequences of changed
circumstances.
57. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 30. This trend begins in the 1930s.
58. C. Jamin, Révision ou intangibilité du contrat ou la double philosophie
de l’article 1134 du Code civil, DR. ET PATR. 46 (1998); See also M. Cédras, Le
solidarisme contractuel en doctrine et devant la Cour de cassation, in RAPPORT
COUR DE CASSATION 2003 (La documentation française 2004), https://perma.cc
/98TZ-95TV.
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revisions of contracts. 59 This solution is further encouraged by the
fact that provisions allowing for the judicial revision of the contract
were part of both the legislation of other European jurisdictions and
the harmonisation projects of contract law at the European level. 60
Like France, and despite its traditional resistance, the Belgian doctrine has taken, in the last decades, a favourable approach to imprévision, based on arguments of good faith, abuse of rights, and equity. 61
Finally, a mitigation of the principle of the sanctity of contracts
is visible in some relatively recent court decisions. While in France
the traditional approach was attenuated through the concepts of
good faith and cause, 62 in Belgium the theory of the abuse of right
has been adopted. Moreover, the courts of both countries have
recognised the theory of imprévision when faced with international

59. Jamin, supra note 58, at 49, 54-57. See also H. Bouthinon-Dumas, Les
contrats relationnels et la théorie de l’imprévision, 15 REV. INT. DR. ÉCON. 361362 (2001).
60. B. Fauvarque-Cosson, Le changement de circonstances, 1 RDC 67
(2004); B. Fauvarque-Cosson, La réforme du droit français des contrats, perspective comparative, 1 RDC 147 (2006); V. Witz, Force obligatoire et durée du contrat, in LES CONCEPTS CONTRACTUELS FRANÇAIS À L’HEURE DES PRINCIPES DU
DROIT EUROPÉEN DES CONTRATS 175 (P. Rémy-Corlay & D. Fenouillet eds., Dalloz 2003). However, among those in favour of the doctrine of changed circumstances, many oppose the judicial revision of the contract and prefer termination as a remedy: see ex multis P. Malaurie, Petite note sur le projet de réforme
du droit des contrats, 1 JCP G 204 (2008); Y. Lequette, Bilan des solidarismes
contractuels, in ÉTUDES DE DROIT PRIVÉ : MÉLANGES OFFERTS À PAUL DIDIER
273 (J. Azéma et al. eds., Economica 2008); E. Savaux, L’introduction de la révision ou de la résiliation pour imprévision - Rapport français, 1 RDC 1057
(2010).
61. VAN OMMESLAGHE & DE PAGE, supra note 41, at 823; D. PHILIPPE,
CHANGEMENT DE CIRCONSTANCES ET BOULEVERSEMENT DE L’ÉCONOMIE CONTRACTUELLE (Bruylant 1986); D. Philippe, Le point sur… l’imprévision, 126
JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 738 (2007); M. Fontaine, Portée et limites du principe
de la convention-loi, in LES OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTUELLES 190 (X. Dieux ed.,
Édition du jeune barreau 1984).
62. However, after the reform of the French Civil Code in 2016, the concept
of cause is no longer mentioned among the essential conditions for the validity of
a contract. As explained in the Rapport au Président, supra note 7, this decision
followed the criticism by both scholars and practitioners, according to which the
cause represented a factor of legal uncertainty due to the difficulty of giving it a
precise definition.
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sales contracts governed by the CISG. 63 The notion of good faith
has been employed by the commercial chamber of the French Cour
de cassation in order to find an obligation for commercial parties to
renegotiate the contract in case of hardship. 64 The refusal to
renegotiate would constitute a breach of the duty to perform the
contract in good faith, which can be sanctioned with a compensation
payment to the other party. 65 Although the remedy granted is not the
typical relief associated to the theory of imprévision, namely the
revision of the contract, 66 these judgements show the efforts of the
Cour de cassation to consider unforeseeable supervening events
disrupting the contractual balance. However praiseworthy this
approach may be, it did not create a general obligation to renegotiate
the contract in those instances. 67 These decisions, according to some
scholars, “can be explained by the particular circumstances of the
two cases and do not testify to a larger change of paradigm.” 68
Moreover, a later judgement denies the possibility of a shift in the
Cour de cassation’s orientation, by refusing to acknowledge the
existence of a duty to renegotiate in case of hardship, as the
aggrieved party accepts the risk of the transaction. 69 In order to
create an exception to the principle of the binding force of the
contract, the French Cour de cassation also resorted to the concept
63. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980.
64. Cass. Com., 3 Nov. 1992, Huard, pourvoi no. 90-18.547; Cass. Com., 24
Nov. 1998, pourvoi no. 96-18.357.
65. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 97; Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 25.
66. On this point, the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux clarified that even if an
obligation to renegotiate the contract in the event of changed circumstances were
to exist, the failure to renegotiate could not lead to imposing on a party the revision of the contract, “this principle of review for unforeseen circumstances being
constantly rejected by the courts since Mar. 6, 1876”; see Bordeaux, 28 Oct. 2015,
RG no. 14/00668, Gaz. Pal. 26 Apr. 2016, no. 16. Against the use of good faith to
overturn the terms of a contract, see Cass. Civ., 9 Dec. 2009, no. 04-19.923, Bull.
civ. III, no. 275; Cass. Com., 10 Jul. 2007, JCP 2007.II.10154.
67. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 25.
68. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 97. Particularly, the fact the both decisions related
to the distribution industry; see C. Pédamon, The Paradoxes of the Theory of Imprévision in the New French Law of Contract: A Judicial Deterrent?, 112 AMICUS
CURIAE 12 (2019).
69. Cass. Civ., 10 Dec. 2003, no. 02-14.990, unreported.
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of cause. It overturned a decision of the court of appeal to impose a
penalty payment on the company Soffimat for not having performed
its obligation, because the court of appeal had failed to investigate
“whether the evolution of economic circumstances … did not have
the effect … of disequilibrating the general economy of the
contract … and of depriving the obligation [of the defendant] of
every counterpart. . . .” 70 In doing so, the court admitted that the
contractual imbalance brought by changed circumstances could
eventually leave the contract without a valid cause. 71 Again, this
ruling did not pave the way for a jurisprudential recognition of the
theory of imprévision. Not only was the judgement not published in
the official bulletin, but the solution proposed was also overturned
by a later decision of the Cour de cassation. 72 Moreover, after the
reform of 2016 the same solution could not be applied anyway
because the concept of cause was removed as an essential element
for the validity of the contract. 73 Turning to Belgium, while, on the
one hand, the Cour de cassation rejected the use of good faith to
overturn the terms of a contract, 74 on the other hand, it employed the
concept of abuse of right in order to interfere with a pre-divorce
agreement, in spite of the pacta sunt servanda principle. The Cour
de cassation considered that the wife had committed abuse of rights
by continuing to demand the performance of the agreement, as it had
become disproportionate to the evolved economic situation of the
parties, and thus released the husband from the payment of
alimony. 75 It is noteworthy that in abolishing the alimony, the Cour
70. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 97; Cass. Com., 29 June 2010, Soffimat, pourvoi
no. 09-67.369, D. 2010, 2481.
71. Lutzi, supra note 23; Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 26.
72. Ancel, supra note 4; Cass. Com., 18 Mar. 2014, no. 12-29.453, D. 2014,
1915, where the Cour de cassation held that the existence of the cause must be
assessed at the moment of contract formation and therefore changing economic
circumstances disrupting the balance of the contract do not make its cause disappear.
73. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 97; Ordonnance no. 2016-131 du 10 février 2016,
art. 1128.
74. Cass., 20 Apr. 2006, Pas., 2006, 884.
75. Cass., 14 Oct. 2010, no. C.09.0608.F/1.
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de cassation contradicted its previous jurisprudence on abuse of
rights, 76 where the remedy had been the reduction of the right, rather
than its suppression. 77 While some 78 believe that the absence of
judicial revision undermines the relevance of this judgement, as it
sets an important distinction between the mechanisms of abuse of
rights and imprévision, others 79 argue that this decision might have
accepted some kind of modification of the contract as a sanction for
the abuse of rights. Lastly, in addition to the developments regarding
internal contracts, the French and Belgian courts of cassation were
openly receptive of imprévision when faced with international sales
contracts governed by the CISG. 80 The CISG does not expressly
regulate hardship, and it is debated whether a party affected by
changed circumstances may find relief under the Convention. 81 It is
even more debated whether the regulation of the remedies to be
granted in case of hardship constitutes an internal gap in the
Convention, which, under article 7.2 CISG, can be filled through the
general principles on which the CISG is based. 82 Nevertheless, the
courts did not hesitate to answer positively to both questions and to
resort to the hardship provisions of the PICC 83 in order to fill the
alleged gap and find, at least, a duty to renegotiate in the event of
changed circumstances.
76. Cass., 11 June 1992, Pas., 1992, I, 898.
77. Biquet-Mathieu, supra note 43, at 216.
78. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 36.
79. Biquet-Mathieu, supra note 43, at 218. In this regard, the author highlights that the Cour de cassation, differently from its previous jurisprudence, does
not mention the prohibition for the judge to amend the content of an agreement.
See also Philippe, supra note 21.
80. For France, see Cass. Com., 17 Feb. 2015, Dupiré Invicta v. Gabo, nos.
12-29550, 13-18956, and 13-20230; for Belgium, see Cass, 19 June 2009, Scafom
International BV v. Lorraine Tubes SAS, no. C.07.0289.N.
81. See, on this point, L. Di Matteo, Contractual Excuse under CISG: Impediment, Hardship and the Excuse Doctrines, 27 PACE INT. LAW REV. (2015).
82. See Dewez et al., The Duty to Renegotiate an International Sales Contract under CISG in Case of Hardship and the Use of the UNIDROIT Principles,
19 EUR. REV. PRIV. LAW 101-154 (2001); S. Slater, Overcome by Hardship: The
Inapplicability of the Unidroit Principles’ Hardship Provisions to CISG, 12 FLA.
J. INT’L L. 231 (1998).
83. Arts. 6.2.2, 6.2.3 PICC.
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C. The Regulation of Imprévision Under the New Article 1195 and
Draft Article 5.77
Eventually, the legislative openness towards imprévision resulted in the French Revision of 2016, 84 introducing the new article
1195 in the French Civil Code, and in the Belgian Draft of 2019,
proposing to insert Book 5 “Obligations” in the Belgian Civil Code
and in particular draft article 5.77. Both of these provisions allow
contractual parties to request the judicial revision of the contract in
case of changed circumstances, should the attempts to renegotiate
the contractual terms fail.
Article 1195 of the French Civil Code85 reads as follows:
If a change of circumstances that was unforeseeable at the
time of the conclusion of the contract renders performance
excessively onerous for a party who had not accepted the risk
of such a change, that party may ask the other contracting
party to renegotiate the contract. The first party must continue to perform his obligations during renegotiation.
In the case of refusal or the failure of renegotiations, the parties may agree to terminate the contract from the date and on
the conditions which they determine, or by a common agreement ask the court to set about its adaptation. In the absence
of an agreement within a reasonable time, the court may, on
the request of a party, revise the contract or put an end to it,
from a date and subject to such conditions as it shall
84. This revision was preceded by the Avant-projet de réforme du droit des
obligations, 2005, (Projet Catala), the Projet de réforme du droit des contrats,
2008, Ministère de la Justice (Avant-projet de la Chancellerie) and by the Projet
Terré, 2013. While the first two envisaged only the power of the aggrieved party
to terminate the contract in the event of hardship, the latter provided for judicial
revision.
85. Art. 1195 C. civ. :
Si un changement de circonstances imprévisible lors de la conclusion du
contrat rend l’exécution excessivement onéreuse pour une partie qui
n’avait pas accepté d’en assumer le risque, celle-ci peut demander une
renégociation du contrat à son cocontractant. Elle continue à exécuter ses
obligations durant la renégociation.
En cas de refus ou d’échec de la renégociation, les parties peuvent convenir de la résolution du contrat, à la date et aux conditions qu’elles déterminent, ou demander d’un commun accord au juge de procéder à son
adaptation. A défaut d’accord dans un délai raisonnable, le juge peut, à
la demande d’une partie, réviser le contrat ou y mettre fin, à la date et
aux conditions qu’il fixe.
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determine. 86
The French provision revolves around three conditions: (1) there
must be a change of circumstances which was unforeseeable at the
moment of the conclusion of the contract; (2) it must render the performance excessively onerous for one party; (3) this party must have
not agreed to bear that risk. 87 As for the effects of imprévision, the
new article 1195 confers upon the aggrieved party the right to request the renegotiation of the agreement. Judicial intervention is an
option of last resort, which can be triggered only if the renegotiations fail or do not take place at all, and if the parties do not reach
an agreement to terminate the contract. Under such circumstances,
parties may either ask the court to adapt the contract by agreement
or individually request the court to terminate or adapt the contract.
On the other hand, the Belgian provision on imprévision, which
is allegedly based on French law, diverges from the latter in some
aspects. Draft article 5.77 88 provides that:
86. J. Cartwright et al., The New Provisions of the Code civil Created by Ordonnance no. 2016-131 of 10 February 2016, translated into English, available
at https://perma.cc/D3GN-26QZ; see also M. SÉJEAN, FRENCH CIVIL CODE, ENGLISH - FRENCH - ARABIC (LexisNexis 2020).
87. C. Pédamon, The New French Contract Law and Its Impact on Commercial Law: Good Faith, Unfair Contract Terms and Hardship, in THE FUTURE OF
THE COMMERCIAL CONTRACT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND LAW REFORM 120 (M. Heidemann & J. Lee eds., Springer 2018).
88. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.77:
Chaque partie doit exécuter ses obligations quand bien même l’exécution
en serait devenue plus onéreuse, soit que le coût de l’exécution ait augmenté, soit que la valeur de la contre-prestation ait diminué.
Toutefois, le débiteur peut demander au créancier de renégocier le contrat en vue de l’adapter ou d’y mettre fin lorsque les conditions suivantes
sont réunies:
1° un changement de circonstances rend excessivement onéreuse l’exécution du contrat de sorte qu’on ne puisse raisonnablement l’exiger;
2° ce changement était imprévisible lors de la conclusion du contrat;
3° ce changement n’est pas imputable au débiteur;
4° le débiteur n’a pas assumé ce risque; et
5° la loi ou le contrat n’exclut pas cette possibilité.
Les parties continuent à exécuter leurs obligations pendant la durée des
renégociations.
En cas de refus ou d’échec des renégociations dans un délai raisonnable,
le juge peut, à la demande de l’une ou l’autre des parties, adapter le contrat afin de le mettre en conformité avec ce que les parties auraient raisonnablement convenu au moment de la conclusion du contrat si elles
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Each party must fulfil his or her obligations even when the
execution has become more onerous, either because the cost
of the execution has increased, or because the value of the
counter-performance has decreased.
However, the debtor may request the creditor to renegotiate
the contract in order to adapt or terminate it when the following conditions are met:
(1) a change of circumstances makes the performance of the
contract excessively onerous so that no one may reasonably
demand it;
(2) the change was unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract;
(3) the change is not attributable to the debtor;
(4) the debtor has not assumed that risk; and
(5) the law or the contract does not exclude this possibility.
The parties continue to perform their obligations during the
renegotiations. In the event of refusal or failure of the renegotiations after a reasonable time, the judge may, at the request of either party, adapt the contract in order to bring it in
line with what the parties would have reasonably agreed at
the time of conclusion of the contract if they had taken into
account the change of circumstances, or terminate the contract in whole or in part from a date that cannot be prior to
the change of circumstances and according to conditions
fixed by the judge. The action is formed and instructed according to the forms of summary proceedings. 89
As for the requirements to be met in order to trigger the Belgian
provision, it is also required, unlike in article 1195, that the change
of circumstances not be attributable to the aggrieved party. The
commentary to draft article 5.77 explains that this requirement must
be read together with draft article 5.299, 90 which defines attributability by linking it to the concept of fault. 91 Moreover, the condition
that “the law or the contract does not exclude this possibility” introduced by draft article 5.77, although not expressly specified in
avaient tenu compte du changement de circonstances, ou mettre fin au
contrat en tout en partie à une date qui ne peut être antérieure au changement de circonstances et selon des modalités fixées par le juge. L’action
est formée et instruite selon les formes du référé.
89. Translated by the author.
90. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art. 5.77.
91. Id. at art. 5.299.
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article 1195, is also a feature of the latter provision. In particular, the
reference to the “law” excluding the possibility to apply draft article
5.77 simply refers to those special legal provisions, such as article
1474/1 of the Belgian Civil Code on equitable judicial review,
which shall prevail over it. 92 By the same token, article 1773 of the
French Civil Code excludes in principle any revision of fixed-price
contracts. 93 As for the possibility that “the contract” excludes the
applicability of draft article 5.77, it refers to the non-mandatory nature of the provision on imprévision, which is also a feature of the
new article 1195. In fact, the comment on article 1195 enshrined in
the Report to the President of the Republic states that parties may
derogate from it.
As to the effects of imprévision, similarly to article 1195, draft
article 5.77 allows the aggrieved party to request renegotiations, and
only as a last resort grants both parties the possibility to ask the judge
either to adapt or terminate the contract.
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPRÉVISION IN LIGHT OF THE GOAL OF
MODERNISATION
The reform projects of the French and Belgian Civil Codes feature a repeated imperative: to modernise. This expression is found
several times both in the Report to the President of the Republic on
the French Revision of 2016 and in the Belgian Draft of 2019. Modernisation is sometimes stated as an independent and overriding
goal, 94 whereas in other passages of those instruments it is described
as the means to achieve other objectives, in particular the protection

92. Id. at art. 5.77.
93. Ancel, supra note 4, at paras. 107-108.
94. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7: “La présente ordonnance est
prise en application de l’article 8 de la loi no. 2015-177 du 16 février 2015 relative
à la modernisation et à la simplification du droit et des procédures dans les domaines de la justice et des affaires intérieures.” See also Belgian Draft of 2019,
supra note 6, Resumé: “Cette proposition vise à moderniser le droit des obligations.”
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of the weaker party. 95 However, this raises the question regarding
the meaning of the modernization of the law of obligations. Both
proposals emphasise the fact that large parts of the Civil Code have
not been modified in more than two centuries and that this triggered
the intervention of courts, which distanced themselves from the
wording of the code in order to adapt it to the changing reality.
Hence, there is the need to codify the solutions developed by the
courts. 96 Consequently, it seems that modernisation, at least in part,
has been perceived by the French and Belgian legislators as keeping
up with the evolution of jurisprudence. This is visible in the incorporation of many jurisprudential rules regarding, for instance,
framework contracts, lapse, unjustified enrichment (articles 1111,
1186, and 1303 of the French Civil Code, respectively), 97 partial

95. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7: “Il est donc apparu nécessaire …
de le moderniser, pour faciliter son accessibilité et sa lisibilité, tout en conservant
l’esprit du code civil, à la fois favorable à un consensualisme propice aux
échanges économiques et protecteur des plus faibles.” See also Belgian Draft of
2019, supra note 6, Resumé: “La proposition a pour objectif . . . de moderniser
l’équilibre entre l’autonomie des parties et le rôle du juge en tant que gardien des
intérêts de la partie faible et de l’intérêt général.”
96. For France, see Rapport au Président, supra note 7:
Force est de constater que les textes actuels ne permettent pas d’appréhender le droit positif, tant la jurisprudence a dû les interpréter, par analogie, a contrario, voire contra legem. La compréhension de nombreuses
dispositions passe ainsi nécessairement par la consultation des décisions
rendues par les tribunaux, voire par l’interprétation qu’en fait la doctrine.
Par ailleurs, la jurisprudence est par essence fluctuante, et ne permet pas
d’assurer la sécurité juridique que seul peut offrir un droit écrit. C’est la
raison pour laquelle l’ordonnance prévoit, pour sa majeure partie, une
codification à droit constant de la jurisprudence, reprenant des solutions
bien ancrées dans le paysage juridique français bien que non écrites.
For Belgium, see Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Introduction Générale:
La jurisprudence a, bien entendu, pu assurer une certaine modernisation
du droit des obligations. . . . L’influence de la jurisprudence est à ce point
considérable que le droit belge des obligations s’apparente de plus en
plus au système de Common law. . . . C’est pour ces mêmes raisons que
le ministre de la Justice décida, conformément à l’Accord de gouvernement du 10 octobre 2014, de créer plusieurs Commissions chargées de
réformer le droit civil.
97. B. MERCADAL, RÉFORME DU DROIT DES CONTRATS : ORDONNANCE DU 10
FÉVRIER 2016 26 (Éditions Francis Lefebvre 2016).
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invalidity, defence of non-performance (draft articles 5.66 and 5.313
of the Belgian draft of 2019, respectively). 98
However, even assuming that the codification of the novelties
brought by the jurisprudence fits a definition of “modernisation,”
the reforms at issue do not simply codify the solutions found in judicial decisions, 99 but go so far as to introduce legal concepts such
as the doctrine of imprévision, which not only had never been codified but had also never been recognised by the jurisprudence of the
Cour de cassation. Therefore, it is fair to wonder whether this innovation actually modernises the Civil Code. Does a revision of the
rules governing the law of contracts necessarily account for a modernisation? Certainly, a new code is not per se a modern code.
Whether the new article 1195 of the French Civil Code and draft
article 5.77 of the Belgian Draft of 2019 are in line with the overall
goal of modernisation, again, depends on how one defines the latter.
The reform projects stress the importance to align the French and
Belgian Civil Codes with the law of foreign countries and with the
European and international projects for the harmonisation of contract law. 100 Therefore, the introduction of rules governing changed
circumstances could be deemed to modernise the Civil Code simply
because it follows the footsteps of other domestic jurisdictions and
transnational legal principles. The French Revision of 2016, on the
other hand, also emphasises the need to strengthen the attractiveness
of its law by adapting it to the developments in the globalised

98. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Introduction Générale.
99. See id.: “Les textes proposés ne sont pas une simple codification de la
jurisprudence. . . .”
100. This is particularly remarked when commenting the introduction of imprévision. For Belgium, see Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire
des articles, art. 5.77, “Le changement de circonstances est pris en compte par
toutes les législations modernes (voy. p. ex. art. 89 CESL; art. 1196 C. civ. fr.; art.
313 BGB; art. 6:258 NBW; art. III.1:110 DCFR; art. 6.2 des PICC. . . .).” For
France, see Rapport au Président, supra note 7:“La France est l’un des derniers
pays d’Europe à ne pas reconnaître la théorie de l’imprévision comme cause modératrice de la force obligatoire du contrat. Cette consécration, inspirée du droit
comparé comme des projets d’harmonisation européens. . . .”
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economy. 101 Hence, although this is a general goal of the reform,
which is not expressly stated in the comment to article 1195, one
may wonder whether the introduction of imprévision modernises the
Civil Code in the sense that it reflects the financial and societal
needs of commercial parties. Ultimately, it is unclear if the new provisions on imprévision are meant to update French and Belgian law
in light of national and transnational legal developments or if they
constitute a concrete response to the commercial needs of businesses. 102 In the following paragraphs, the question of the modernisation of the French and Belgian Civil Codes through the introduction of the doctrine of imprévision will be analysed from both points
of view.
A. Modernisation Through Harmonisation
In the first sense in which modernisation can be understood, the
French Report to the President of the Republic makes a vague reference to “comparative law” and to “European harmonisation projects” as the sources of inspiration of the new solution. 103 Along the
same lines, the commentary to draft article 5.77 in the Belgian Draft
of 2019, after having highlighted that all modern legislations take
into account imprévision, lists by way of example several domestic
jurisdictions (France, Germany, the Netherlands) as well as international and European harmonisation projects (Common European
Sales Law, 104 DCFR, PICC). However, it is stated that the Belgian
provision is based particularly on the CESL and French law. 105 If
modernisation is intended to keep up with the legal developments of
other jurisdictions, it is necessary to compare the French and Belgian solutions with those adopted by the national, international, and
European instruments mentioned in the respective reform projects.
101. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7.
102. Pédamon, supra note 68, at 10.
103. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7; Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 41.
104. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on a Common European Sales Law [hereinafter, CESL].
105. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art. 5.77.
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Overall, the idea of judicial intervention to correct a contractual
imbalance, caused by unforeseeable changed circumstances, by
means of revision or termination of the contract reflects a common
trend both in domestic jurisdictions 106 and in international and European instruments. 107 France was, and Belgium still is, one of the
last countries to refuse to apply the theory of imprévision, together
with a number of other legal systems based on the Code Napoléon
(such as Luxemburg and Quebec) and common law jurisdictions.108
Moreover, when it comes to renegotiation, France and Belgium
proved to be one step ahead of other domestic jurisdictions, such as
Germany, Italy, and The Netherlands (among others), that do not
contain such a requirement. 109 Although they are not imposed upon
the parties (as in the CESL, DCFR, and PECL), the French and Belgian provisions attach great importance to renegotiations, as they are
a necessary condition to then be able to request judicial intervention.
For what specifically concerns the conditions for imprévision, if we
exclude the requirement that the change not be attributable to the
aggrieved party (draft article 5.77), 110 the other conditions shared by
the French and Belgian provisions (excessive onerousness of the
106. See these civil codes: The Netherlands (art. 6:258), Germany (§313),
Greece (art. 388), Egypt (art. 147), Turkey (art. 138), Portugal (art. 437), Argentina (old Civil Code) (art. 1198(2)), Bolivia (art. 581−583), Brazil (art. 478−480),
Paraguay (art. 672), Peru (art. 1440−1444), Colombia (art. 868), El Salvador (art.
994), and Guatemala (art. 688). Art. 1467 of the Italian Civil Code deserves a
particular mention: although the provision only allows the aggrieved party to request judicial termination, the other party may avoid termination by offering an
equitable modification of the contractual terms. However, the Italian Supreme
Court has interpreted this provision as to allow “the judge’s intervention in the
adaptation process by stating that if the offer is inadequate, the judge may determine an equitable revision of the contract,” see M. Kovac & C. Poncibò, Towards
a Theory of Imprévision in the EU?, 14 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 357 (2018).
107. See art. 6:111 PECL; art. 6.2.3 PICC; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 89 CESL;
art. 157 European Contract Code (Code Gandolfi); art. 7:101 Principes contractuels communs de l’Association Capitant (PCC).
108. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 34.
109. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 112; Pédamon, supra note 87, at 122.
110. It is noteworthy that this requirement is absent not only in the CESL and
in the French Civil Code, which are described as a direct source of inspiration of
the Belgian provision, but also in any of the provisions listed in the commentary
to the Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.77.
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performance, unforeseeability of the event, and non-acceptance of
the risk) are in line with those found in many of the above-mentioned instruments. 111 Therefore, in this sense, the introduction of
imprévision can be deemed as an element of modernisation of
French and Belgian law.
B. Modernisation as the Reflection of the Interests of Commercial
Parties
Alternatively, the modernisation of the law can be conceived as
the operation aimed at accommodating new economic and social
needs. The logic behind the modernisation of the French Civil Code,
as stated in the Report to the President of the Republic, was to increase the attractiveness of French law to international business. In
order to do this, the new provisions need to constitute a concrete
response to the commercial needs of international companies. In
light of the strong criticism that has followed the introduction of imprévision, 112 one may wonder whether the new provisions pay heed
to the actual needs of companies and investors. Not only scholars,
but also practitioners warned about the impact of such a reform. The
working group set up by DLA Piper France on the reform of the
Civil Code gathered many practitioners who discussed the proposed
innovations. The doctrine of imprévision, in particular, was criticised for allowing courts to rewrite contracts, as this clashes with
the normal tasks envisioned for a civil law judge and threatens legal

111. This is the structure followed by art. 1467 Italian Civil Code, art. 6:111
PECL; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 89 CESL. Art. 6.2.2 PICC and art. 313 BGB
feature the requirements on foreseeability and risk-taking, however they diverge
when it comes to the impact of changed circumstances on the situation of the parties. Art. 6.2.2 PICC refers to a fundamental alteration of the contractual equilibrium as a result of the event, while art. 313 BGB mentions a performance which
cannot reasonably be expected to be upheld without alteration, rather than a performance rendered excessively onerous.
112. Kovac & Poncibò, supra note 106, at 353; P. Stoffel-Munck, Les clauses
abusives: on attendait Grouchy, 240 DROIT ET PATRIMOINE 56 (2014); Y. M. Laithier, Les règles relatives à l’inexécution des obligations contractuelles, 21 JCP
G SUPPL 52 (2015).
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certainty. 113 Other risks brought by the doctrine of imprévision
would be the “possible exploitation by dishonest contracting parties,
attempting evasion from unfavourable contracts, the subsequent
contamination effect of the termination or revision of contracts, and
the destabilisation of contracting parties’ anticipations.” 114 The fear
of businesses towards the uncertainty brought by the doctrine of imprévision makes the assumption that this innovation answers the
commercial needs of companies less plausible. However, some additional considerations are necessary. The desire of the French legislator to increase the attractiveness of French law was aimed at facilitating its application in international law contracts. 115 Thus, it
seems that the target of the reform is primarily companies operating
cross-border, which are aware of the risk of unforeseen changes of
circumstances in international trade. 116 Especially in long-term contractual relationships, international commercial parties prefer to
safeguard their lasting and productive relationship, in order to preserve their mutual interests. 117 Therefore, the commercial need to
remedy a contractual imbalance (and have the contract revised) is
perceived at the international level. That being said, it is also true
that large companies operating internationally have a preference for
regulating themselves the consequences of unforeseen circumstances by including the so-called hardship clauses within their
113. DLA Piper & Cercle Montesquieu, Groupe de travail sur le projet d’ordonnance et la réforme du Code civil, Travaux depuis février 2015, 204 (2016).
114. A. Pietrancosta, Introduction of the Hardship Doctrine (“théorie de l’imprévision”) into French Contract Law: A Mere Revolution on the Books?, 3
RTDF 1 (2016).
115. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7.
116. E. Zaccaria, The Effects of Changed Circumstances in International Commercial Trade, 9 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 136 (2005):
The risk of hardship is virtually inevitable in the field of international
trade, as the economic and political context is subject to continual flux
and rapid change. A great number of factors may intervene, such as an
alteration in the political situation of a nation, an unexpected price rise
in raw materials or a sudden depreciation of currency. Naturally, the
longer the contract lasts, the greater the risk that circumstances may
change. As international contracts generally last a long time this risk is
ever present.
117. Id.
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agreements, in order to avoid any judicial interference. 118 However,
small and medium-sized enterprises usually lack the know-how to
address in detail hardship situations through sophisticated contractual clauses. Consequently, it is fair to say that new article 1195 is a
response to the interests of the latter enterprises, which in the absence of a default provision on unforeseen circumstances would
bear the financial consequences of the contractual imbalance. 119 At
the same time, as highlighted during the parliamentary debate, 120 the
non-mandatory nature of new article 1195 does not affect the commercial needs of large corporations, which may continue to regulate
imprévision in the contract, therefore ruling out the application of
the provision. At least in theory, the introduction of imprévision
pays heed to the needs of small corporations, without impairing
those of large companies, and therefore, in this limited sense, modernises the Civil Code. However, in practice much will depend on
the bargaining power of small and medium-sized enterprises. Indeed, when they trade with large corporations, the latter may impose
their contractual power to opt-out from the rules on imprévision.
Hence, to cope with possible contractual abuse, the legislators could
have followed the example of article 7:102 of the “Common Contractual Principles” by the Henri Capitant Association, according to
which “[a] clause which would apportion to one of the parties the
essential risks of a change of circumstances is valid only if it does
not entail unreasonable consequences for that party.” 121
118. Pédamon, supra note 68, at 11, 13, 17.
119. Id. at 11.
120. As remarked by the member of the Senate François Pillet, judicial intervention will be limited due to the fact that commercial parties who benefit from
legal advice will systematically exclude the provision from the contract.
121. See PROJET DE CADRE COUMMUN DE RÉFÉRENCE : PRINCIPES CONTRACTUAL COMMUN (SLC 2008); see also B. Fauvarque-Cosson, Does Review on the
Ground of Imprévision Breach the Principle of the Binding Force of Contracts?,
in THE CODE NAPOLÉON REWRITTEN: FRENCH CONTRACT LAW AFTER THE 2016
REFORMS 200 (J. Cartwright & S. Whittaker eds., Hart Publ’g 2017). The author
notes that in France, art. 1171 of the Civil Code on unfair terms applies exclusively to standard-form contracts, only the control on contract terms prescribed
by art. L 442-6 I 2 of the Commercial Code might be able to exclude these optout clauses.
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IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPRÉVISION IN LIGHT OF THE GOAL OF
LEGAL CERTAINTY
The second goal of the French and Belgian reforms of contract
law was to attain more legal certainty (sécurité juridique). This term
can assume different connotations depending on the various legal
systems.
A. The Disputed Meaning of “Legal Certainty”
European countries tend to believe that there is legal certainty
when the law is codified, as opposed to English contract law, where
ensuring legal certainty means giving effect to the contract and to
honest parties’ reasonable expectations. 122
The European approach to legal certainty is visible within the
French Revision of 2016 and the Belgian Draft of 2019: both
stressed that the main threat to legal certainty is the development of
rules by courts, interpreting or even contradicting the wording of
their civil codes. 123 Therefore, codifying the judicial innovations
and enacting clear rules was considered the solution to prevent the
judicial creation of law and to ensure legal certainty.
The commentary to draft article 5.77 in the Belgian draft of 2019
states that the inclusion of imprévision also contributes to legal certainty, as it is in line with the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation
which tends to accept it gradually. However, as it has been shown, 124
the Belgian Cour de cassation has never accepted in principle the
theory of imprévision, but simply mitigated the principle of the binding force of contracts on grounds of abuse of rights. Moreover, the
commentary to draft article 5.77 makes reference to two judgements
rendered by the Cour de cassation, where the law applicable was the
CISG and it was supplemented by the PICC’s provisions on
122. H. G. BEALE ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONTRACT
LAW 8-11 (Hart Publ’g 2019).
123. See supra Introduction, at p.5.
124. See supra Section II(B).
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hardship. 125 While, on the one hand, these judgements show a modern approach by Belgian judges towards imprévision and the transnational instruments on international contracts, on the other hand,
they do not prove an internal openness on the same issue. The same
applies to France, where the Cour de cassation occasionally employed various legal arguments to loosen the principle of pacta sunt
servanda. Therefore, the introduction of imprévision cannot be considered a codification of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, its codification might promote legal certainty, according to the European connotation, as it eliminates the uncertainty of commercial parties, also
in light of the fluctuating and uncertain jurisprudence, related to the
possibility to obtain relief in the event of hardship.
By contrast, following the approach of English contract law, the
French and Belgian provisions might well be a threat to legal certainty, both for the possibility of the judge to adapt the contract and
for the broad and vague drafting of the provisions. According to
English contract law, the interplay between the principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda favours the parties’ decision-making over the judicial one. 126 It is precisely the power of the
courts to interfere with the contractual relationship that mostly worries businesses, since it represents a significant source of uncertainty
as opposed to holding parties to the agreed terms. 127 Moreover, the
common law also links legal certainty to the precise and detailed
regulation of the situations in which a law can be applied. 128 For an
English lawyer, the French and Belgian provisions might pose problems of legal certainty with regard to the conditions necessary to
trigger their application. The broad way in which the legal propositions have been drafted raises concerns in relation to the possible
125. Cass, 19 June 2009, Scafom International BV v Lorraine Tubes SAS, no.
C.07.0289.N.; Cass., 12 Apr. 2013, Pas., 2013, 863.
126. S. Whittaker, Contracts, Contract Law and Contractual Principle, in THE
CODE NAPOLÉON REWRITTEN: FRENCH CONTRACT LAW AFTER THE 2016 REFORMS, supra note 121, at 31.
127. Rowan, supra note 19, at 809.
128. Whittaker, supra note 126, at 32.
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interpretation by French and Belgian courts, in the absence of a wellestablished line of cases on the issue. 129
Since studies have shown that the judicial revision of contracts
does not impact legal certainty, 130 the focus of this section will be
on the possible uncertainties related to the requirements for imprévision under new article 1195 and draft article 5.77.
B. Time of the Change of Circumstances
The first doubt concerns the fact that, unlike provisions which
clarify that the event causing hardship must occur after the conclusion of the contract, 131 the French and Belgian ones are silent on the
issue. Sometimes, an event may occur before the contract is concluded but the parties are not aware of its existence when they sign
the agreement. The absence of this requirement would, prima facie,
lead to the conclusion that article 1195 and draft article 5.77 cover
these situations. Such interpretation would be confirmed by the 2003
ICC-Hardship Clause, which does not feature the above-mentioned
requirement and explains that:
[T]his Clause is not limited to situations where the events
rendering performance excessively onerous occurred after
the time the contract was concluded . . . on the ground that a
party might wish to invoke the Clause in circumstances
where it simply did not know – and could not have known –
of the existence of the event at the time of the conclusion of
the contract. 132
Therefore, the French and Belgian legislators could have perhaps been more precise. In order to rule out the existing doubts, they
could have either stated that the event must occur after the conclusion of the contract, or, following the example of the PICC, specified
129. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 109.
130. M. Mekki, Hardship and Modification (or ‘Revision’) of the Contract, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 7 (A. S. Hartkamp ed., Kluwer 2011).
131. See art. 6:111 PECL; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 89 CESL; art. 313 BGB.
132. See International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Force Majeure Clause
2003/ICC Hardship Clause 2003 11, 17, available at https://perma.cc/UU6G76N4.
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that there is hardship when “the events occur or become known to
the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the contract.” 133
C. Manifestations of Imprévision
The second dilemma concerns the situations which in principle
can amount to imprévision. 134 While draft article 5.77 makes clear
that performance can become excessively onerous due to either an
increase in the cost of performance or a decrease in the value of the
counter-performance, article 1195 merely refers to events rendering
performance excessively onerous for a party. On the surface, it
seems that article 1195 takes into account solely events making performance more costly, excluding the second set of events. It has
been suggested that onerousness should be deemed as a benefit-cost
ratio which negatively affects one party, and therefore should be
viewed in terms of the difference between the value of the performance rendered and the value of the counter-performance. 135 In doing so, article 1195 would also cover situations where, even though
the cost of executing the contract is unaltered for one party, this cost
can no longer be absorbed to the same extent due to the drop in the
value of the compensation received. 136 Moreover, the international
and European instruments from which the French legislator has
drawn inspiration, 137 make clear that both situations fall within their
scope. It is ultimately unclear whether the French legislator intended
to reduce the ambit of new article 1195 or whether it considered the
clarification unnecessary. However, according to the maxim of interpretation ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus (i.e.,
“where the law does not distinguish, nor the interpreter must
133. Art. 6.2.2 PICC.
134. For a discussion on the possibility for art. 1195 to cover situations of loss
of interest in the contract, see Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 77.
135. P. Stoffel-Munck, L’imprévision et la réforme des effets du contrat, RDC
30 (2016).
136. O. DESHAYES ET AL., RÉFORME DU DROIT DES CONTRATS, DU RÉGIME GÉNÉRAL ET DE LA PREUVE DES OBLIGATIONS 396 (LexisNexis 2016).
137. See art. 6:111 PECL; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 89 CESL; art. 6.2.2 PICC.
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distinguish”), the general formulation of a legal text leads to its general application. Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the French
formula, vast as it is, includes the two Belgian hypotheses.
D. Excessive Onerousness of the Performance
Another problem in the interpretation of new article 1195 and
draft article 5.77 concerns the meaning of “excessively” onerous.
The wording adopted shows that not any difficulty in performing the
contract will trigger the application of the provisions on imprévision.
The Belgian provision, emulating international and European harmonisation projects, 138 is more precise than the French one in this
respect, as it prescribes that “[e]ach party must fulfil its obligations
even when the execution has become more onerous.” 139 Even if Article 1195 does not contain such clarification, it is evident from its
wording that it will cover only exceptional situations, as imprévision
is conceived as an exception to the binding force of the contract.140
Nevertheless, neither article 1195 nor draft article 5.77 contain any
indication as to how to determine the excess. Surely, there must be
a significant gap between the benefit received and the cost incurred.
However, the excessive onerousness might be defined in different
ways. One option could be to distinguish mere onerousness from
excessive onerousness in the following manner: a performance
would be merely more onerous when “the costs of performance exceed the contract price but not yet the value of performance to the
promisee” 141; excessively onerous would be when the “costs of performance increase to a level where those costs exceed the initial net
value of performance.” 142 Alternatively, the excessiveness might be
138. Id.
139. Translated by the author.
140. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7, this is clear from the report,
where imprévision is defined as a moderating cause of the binding force of the
contract.
141. M. Kovac, Frustration of Purpose and the French Contract Law Reform:
The Challenge to the International Commercial Attractiveness of English Law?,
25 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 301 (2018).
142. Id. at 300.
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defined by indicating a threshold percentage that must be met. This
concept is not new either to the French and Belgian legislators 143 or
to the French administrative jurisprudence. 144 A threshold for hardship featured also the PICC, from which France and Belgium drew
inspiration: the Official Comment on the 1994 edition of the PICC
stated that “an alteration amounting to 50% or more of the cost or
the value of the performance is likely to amount to a ‘fundamental’
alteration.” 145 However, as of the PICC’s 2004 edition, the 50%
minimum threshold was removed because, as shown in the preparatory works, it was criticized in scholarly writings as being too low
and arbitrary. 146 The absence of any directive or threshold to determine the excessive onerousness leads towards a factual evaluation
by the judge on a case-by-case basis. 147 This raises the question
whether the excessive onerousness will be measured, objectively,
against the counter-performance or, subjectively, against the parties’
conditions. In the first case, courts will assess the balance between
143. For France, see art. L. 411-13, French Rural Code:
Le preneur ou le bailleur qui, lors de la conclusion du bail, a contracté à
un prix supérieur ou inférieur d’au moins un dixième à la valeur locative
de la catégorie du bien particulier donné à bail, peut, au cours de la troisième année de jouissance, et une seule fois pour chaque bail, saisir le
tribunal paritaire qui fixe, pour la période du bail restant à courir à partir
de la demande, le prix normal du fermage selon les modalités ci-dessus.
For Belgium, see art. 6, Law of Apr. 30, 1951 on Commercial Leases:
A l’expiration de chaque triennat, les parties ont le droit de demander au
juge de paix la révision du loyer, à charge d’établir que, par le fait de
circonstances nouvelles, la valeur locative normale de l’immeuble loué
est supérieure ou inférieure d’au moins 15 p.c. au loyer stipulé dans le
bail ou fixé lors de la dernière révision.
144. See Direction des Affaires Économiques et Internationales du Ministère
de l’équipement (France), note du 18 mai 2004 de la DAEI relative à la hausse du
cours de l’acier, 3, available at https://perma.cc/RS8N-23C8. The note stated that
judgements rendered since 1974 accept a disruption of the general economy of
the contract when there is a 10% increase of the initial amount of the contract.
145. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts with Official Commentary, 1994, art. 6.2.2 [hereinafter, PICC Official Commentary].
146. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Working Group
for the Preparation of Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Consolidated Edition of Part I and Part II of the Principles of International Commercial
Contracts: Decided Amendments & Open Questions Memorandum (Rome, Apr.
2013), available at https://perma.cc/K7AS-SA9G.
147. P. Stoffel-Munck, La révision du contrat par l’arbitre à la lumière de
l’article 1195 du Code civil, 1 REV. ARB. 58 (2017).
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the performances or the obligations arising from the contract, while
in the second case courts will consider the impact of the changed
circumstances on the financial situation of the party, even though
there is no disproportion with the counter-performance received. 148
While the French provision is completely silent on the issue, draft
article 5.77 suggests that the aggrieved party’s personal situation
might be taken into account. Indeed, the Belgian provision refers to
a change of circumstances which makes the execution of the contract excessively onerous in a way that “no one may reasonably demand it.” This wording recalls the subjective approach taken by article 313 BGB and article 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. The German provision refers to a change of circumstances so burdensome
that “one of the parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the
contract without alteration,” while the Dutch one speaks of “unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the opposite party, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect an
unchanged continuation of the agreement.” As it has been noted, 149
these broader formulations go beyond the mere imbalance between
the performances and could allow courts to take into consideration
whether maintaining the contract would lead to the financial ruin of
the party.
E. Unforeseeability of the Event
Moreover, the French and Belgian provisions raise further concerns regarding the condition of unforeseeability. Both article 1195
and draft article 5.77 require that the change of circumstances was
“unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract.” On the
other hand, many of the above-mentioned harmonisation projects
link the unforeseeability to a standard of reasonableness, by requiring that the event could not have been reasonably foreseeable at the

148. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 76.
149. See id. at para. 78.
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moment the contract was concluded. 150 This departure from the
standard of reasonableness is even more remarkable with respect to
new article 1195. Indeed, the new article 1218 of the French Civil
Code on force majeure defines an unforeseeable event as one which
“could not reasonably be foreseen.” This difference in the drafting
of the provisions poses problems of interpretation both with regard
to the object of foreseeability and the modality of its assessment.151
The first problem concerns what has to be unforeseeable: whether
the nature of the event only or also its extent. If the wording of the
French and Belgian provisions was to be interpreted in the first
sense, it could lead to an assessment of the object of foreseeability
in absolute terms, reducing the scope of application of the rules.152
Indeed, since everything can be foreseeable in abstracto, the rise in
the costs of performance can in principle always be anticipated by
the parties. 153 A different question is whether, in concreto, costs increases of a certain magnitude can reasonably be anticipated at the
moment of conclusion of the contract. A relativization is necessary
because even if an event is in principle foreseeable (e.g., the rise in
the cost of raw materials) its extent can well be reasonably unforeseeable (e.g., an extraordinary and unprecedent rise in those
costs). 154 Otherwise, as it has been noted, 155 parties would have to
bear the consequences of an event which could in principle have
been foreseen, even if the worst-case scenario was considered.
150. See art. 6:111 PECL; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 6.2.2 PICC.
151. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 81.
152. Id.
153. J. Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT Principles, 5 TUL. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 16-17 (1997):
Anyone who has read a bit of history or who has lived for three or more
decades of the twentieth century can foresee, in a general way, the possibility of war, revolution, embargo, plague, terrorism, hyper-inflation
and economic depression, among the other horrors that have afflicted the
human race. If one reads science fiction, one learns of the possibility of
new terrors that have not yet afflicted us, but involve possibilities that
are not pure fantasy.
154. G. CHANTEPIE & M. LATINA, LE NOUVEAU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS,
COMMENTAIRE THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DANS L’ORDRE DU CODE CIVIL 473 (Dalloz 2018).
155. Id. at 474.
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Secondly, this requirement raises the question of how to conduct the
assessment of unforeseeability, whether objectively or subjectively.
In other words, whether the change of circumstances should be objectively unforeseeable for any reasonable person under the same
conditions or whether it is enough that the parties did not consider
the occurrence of the event. 156 A definition of unforeseeability along
with the standard of reasonableness would surely point towards an
objective assessment, 157 but the present formulation might have
courts consider to what extent the parties actually foresaw the occurrence of the changed circumstances. 158 In any case, the absence
of the adverb “reasonably” does not automatically entail a subjective
assessment of unforeseeability, as ample discretion is left to courts
in conducting this test. 159
On a more general note, it is not surprising that the new article
1195, even more than draft article 5.77, does not provide definitions
or a detailed regulation of its conditions of application. The French
legislator usually leaves this task to courts and scholars, as its primary concern is to adopt clear and general legal propositions, devoid
of any technicality, which are comprehensible to ordinary citizens. 160 This is where the contrast between France and common law
jurisdictions in respect to legal certainty becomes more evident:
while a French lawyer would deem such clear and accessible rules
to promote sécurité juridique, an English lawyer would consider
them to be against it because of their uncertain content which gives
courts wide margins of appreciation. 161

156. Id.
157. Stoffel-Munck, supra note 147, at 60-61; Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 81;
CHANTEPIE & LATINA, supra note 154, at 474.
158. Pédamon, supra note 87, at 120.
159. Fauvarque-Cosson, supra note 121, at 197.
160. BEALE ET AL., supra note 122, at 10.
161. Id.

230

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

V. THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPRÉVISION IN LIGHT OF THE GOAL OF
CONTRACTUAL JUSTICE
The above-mentioned objectives of the French and Belgian reforms coexist with the goal of contractual justice, which needs to be
affirmed.
A. The Meaning of Contractual Justice
In France, the idea of contractual justice has been developed by
way of two grand legal theories: autonomy of the will and contractual solidarity. 162 The school of autonomy of the will believes that
since parties freely determine the content of the contract, there can
be no exceptions to its binding force. The doctrine of contractual
solidarity, which was a response to the first, holds that the idea of
autonomy as a general principle is curtailed by a set of exceptions
based on contractual solidarity, among which is the doctrine of imprévision. 163 Through the lenses of solidarity, contractual relationships are not perceived anymore as bargains to make as much profit
as possible, but rather as “a kind of microcosm, a small society
where everyone must work towards a common goal.” 164 Hence, a
duty of cooperation is imposed upon the parties in order to achieve
said common goal. 165 Moreover, unlike the school of autonomy of
the will, which believes that only the contractual parties can judge
the content of the contract, the person responsible for ensuring solidarity against the letter of the contract, in the silence of the legislator, is the judge, who in the event of hardship may step in to correct
the contractual imbalance by terminating or adapting the agreement. 166

162.
163.
164.
1931).
165.
2018).
166.

Cédras, supra note 58.
Id.
R. DEMOGUE, 6 TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS EN GÉNÉRAL 9 (Rousseau
Y. BUFFELAN-LANORE ET AL., DROIT CIVIL : LES OBLIGATIONS 290 (Sirey
Cédras, supra note 58.
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It is believed that considerations of contractual justice might
clash with the goal of legal certainty pursued by the reforms. 167 Legal certainty, at least for common law lawyers, aims not only at the
precise and detailed regulation of the situations in which the law can
be applied, but also at allowing parties to clearly establish their duties and performances. 168 Consequently, the judicial interference
with contractual terms, based on grounds of contractual justice, is
deemed to sacrifice pragmatism and transactional certainty. 169 However, the French and Belgian legislators consider the two goals compatible. In France, this is visible in the new chapter of the Civil Code
entitled “Introductory Provisions,” where freedom of contract (article 1102), binding force of the contract (article 1103) and good faith
(article 1104) are stated as three fundamental principles. As explained by the Report to the President of the Republic, this choice
expresses one of the essential objectives pursued by the French Revision of 2016: to find a balance between contractual justice and autonomy of the will. 170 The Belgian Draft of 2019 also aims at finding
a harmony between these principles, as one paramount objective of
the proposal is to “modernize the balance between the autonomy of
the parties and the role of the judge as guardian of the interests of
the weaker party.” 171
The idea behind contractual justice is to maintain the contractual
equilibrium within the transaction, by allowing the judge to balance
or rebalance the contract. 172 In addition to the provisions on
167. F. CHÉNEDÉ, LE NOUVEAU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRATS
CONSOLIDATIONS, INNOVATIONS, PERSPECTIVES 9 (Dalloz 2018).

:

168. Whittaker, supra note 126, at 32.
169. Rowan, supra note 19, at 809. These considerations of contractual justice
to the detriment of legal certainty are traditionally indicated as one of the main
reasons why French law is less attractive to foreign companies and investors as
compared to common law systems.
170. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7.
171. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Resumé.
172. BUFFELAN-LANORE ET AL., supra note 165, at 414; P. Stoffel-Munck, Les
enjeux majeurs de la réforme “Attractivité, Sécurité, Justice”, in RÉFORME DU
DROIT DES CONTRATS ET PRATIQUE DES AFFAIRES 22 (P. Stoffel-Munck ed., Dalloz
2015); Whittaker, supra note 126, at 50.
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imprévision, the Belgian proposal also achieves this result by regulating abuse of circumstances (draft article 5.41), 173 while in France,
after the 2016 reform, contractual justice is pursued, among others,
through the articles on violence in the case of the abuse of a state of
dependence (article 1143) and unfair terms in standard contracts (article 1171). 174
For what specifically concerns the French and Belgian provisions on imprévision, the relation with the goal of contractual justice
can be found in the ratio juris of the former. Namely, that “to insist
on the binding force of contract in such extreme situations, which
may cause several difficulties on the disadvantaged party is judged
as obviously unfair.” 175 Therefore, when a supervening change of
circumstances making performance excessively onerous for one
party occurs, courts step in to correct the serious contractual imbalance that arises during the execution of the contract. However, as
analysed above, the broad wording adopted by the French and Belgian legislators when drafting the requirements for imprévision may
trigger different judicial interpretations. Therefore, these requirements will be analysed in the following sections with a view to finding the interpretation that better suits the goal of contractual justice.

173. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Introduction Générale :
[L]e juge se verra investi de pouvoirs lui permettant de corriger des situations de déséquilibre contractuel (par exemple, lorsque l’économie du
contrat est bouleversée à la suite de circonstances nouvelles imprévisibles – la théorie de l’imprévision – ou lorsque les prestations sont, dès
le départ, affectées d’un déséquilibre manifeste par suite d’un abus par
une partie de la position de faiblesse de l’autre partie – l’abus de circonstances).
174. For an analysis of the provisions of the French Civil Code pursuing contractual justice, see Whittaker, supra note 126, at 50-54.
175. B. BAŞOĞLU, THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CRISES ON THE BINDING FORCE
OF CONTRACTS - RENEGOTIATION, RESCISSION OR REVISION 9 (Springer 2016).
Although the author is referring to financial crisis, the ratio juris can be extended
to all the events causing hardship.

2020]

IMPRÉVISION IN FRANCE & BELGIUM

233

B. The Contrast Between a Narrow Interpretation of the Requirements and the Goal of Contractual Justice
To begin with, an interpretation of the requirements for imprévision under the new article 1195 and draft article 5.77 that conforms
to the goal of contractual justice is one which avoids that situations
of contractual imbalance evade the scope of the rules at issue. In
other words, interpretations which excessively narrow down the
scope of the provisions on imprévision, to the detriment of the party
affected by the supervening event, run counter to the realisation of
contractual fairness.
1. Time of the Change of Circumstances: The Relationship
Between the Doctrine of Imprévision and the Doctrine of Mistake
As it has been pointed out above, the first uncertainty concerns
the possibility for the French and Belgian provisions to cover not
only events which occur after the conclusion of the contract, but also
those occurring before the contract is concluded when the parties are
not aware of their existence as they sign the agreement. If the absence of an express requirement in the first sense points towards the
inclusion of the latter situations within article 1195 and draft article
5.77, the same conclusion must be reached on grounds of contractual
fairness. These provisions require a change of circumstances that
was unforeseeable at the time of contract conclusion. This change
does not necessarily need to be factual but can also concern the intellectual considerations of the parties. 176 Therefore, when the parties could not know of the existence of the event causing hardship at
the moment of contract conclusion, and learn about it only later in
time, there is a change of circumstances under article 1195 and draft
article 5.77. Since such changes create a contractual imbalance just
like any other hardship situation occurring after the conclusion of
176. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 391.
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the contract, it would be against contractual justice to exclude them
from the scope of the provisions. However, such solution might
clash with the fact that the unawareness of existing circumstances at
the time of contract conclusion has traditionally been dealt with under the doctrine of “mistake” or “error” (a more civilian term) as a
vice of consent. 177 This doctrine, which is enshrined in article 1130
and following articles of the French Civil Code 178 and article 1110
of the Belgian Civil Code, 179 refers to situations where a party has
given its consent due to misrepresentation of either the obligations
arising out of the contract or of the identity of the other contracting
party. 180 The mistaken party is entitled to obtain the relative nullity
of the contract provided that the misrepresentation was decisive for
its consent. 181 Consequently, when a party signs an agreement just
because that party ignores the real circumstances, the doctrine of
177. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 69. The author argues that art. 1195 should
be interpreted as not covering events already existing at the moment of the conclusion of the contract but ignored by the party, as these situations are covered by
the doctrine of “mistake.”
178. In particular, see Cartwright et al., supra note 86, which provides the following translation of art. 1132: “Mistake of law or of fact, as long as it is not
inexcusable, is a ground of nullity of the contract where it bears on the essential
qualities of the act of performance owed or of the other contracting party.”
179. Art. 1110, Belgian Civil Code:
L’erreur n’est une cause de nullité de la convention que lorsqu’elle
tombe sur la substance même de la chose qui en est l’objet.
Elle n’est point une cause de nullité, lorsqu’elle ne tombe que sur la personne avec laquelle on a intention de contracter, à moins que la considération de cette personne ne soit la cause principale de la convention.
180. F. TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 309 (Dalloz 2018); Y.
BUFFELAN-LANORE ET AL., supra note 165, at 299; C. Goux, L’erreur, le dol et la
lésion qualifiée : analyse et comparaisons, in LA THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES OBLIGATIONS 24-25 (P. Wery ed., Formation permanente CUP 1998).
181. For France, see J. Cartwright et al., supra note 86, which provides the
following translation of art. 1130: “Mistake, fraud and duress vitiate consent
where they are of such a nature that, without them, one of the parties would not
have contracted or would have contracted on substantially different terms.” For
Belgium, see P. Van Ommeslaghe, Examen de jurisprudence (1974 à 1982) - Les
obligations, 6 R.C.J.B. 33 (1986), where the author explains that this is the interpretation of art. 1110 provided by the Belgian Cour de cassation. See also Belgian
Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.38, which codifies the latter interpretation by
providing that: “L’erreur n’est une cause de nullité que lorsqu’une partie a, de
manière excusable, une représentation erronée d’un élément qui l’a déterminée à
conclure le contrat, alors que l’autre partie connaissait ou devait connaître ce caractère déterminant.”
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mistake appears more appropriate than the doctrine of imprévision,
as it allows the mistaken party to deprive its contractual commitment
of legal effect. However, a better understanding of the relationship
between the doctrine of mistake and that of imprévision requires further considerations. Firstly, there are situations in which the doctrine
of mistake cannot be applied to the unawareness of hardship situations already existing when the contract was concluded, and therefore no conflict with the doctrine of imprévision arises. Indeed, in
order to preserve commercial transactions, not every mistake, even
if decisive, can make the contract null. 182 In particular, a mistake as
to the mere value of performance is irrelevant, unless it bears on the
“essential qualities of the act of performance” 183 (article 1136,
French Civil Code) or on “a decisive characteristic of the subject
matter of the contract” 184 (draft article 5.38, Belgian draft of 2019).
A mistake as to the value is based on the incorrect monetary valuation of the performance, in the sense that the purchase price was either too high or too low compared to the value of the service offered. 185 An example of such mistake can be found in a manufacturing contract where the manufacturer sets the price without knowing
that the cost of raw materials has recently increased. 186 Had the manufacturer known about the increased cost, the final price would have
been commensurate with the economic value of its performance.
182. TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 180, at 310.
183. Cartwright et al., supra note 86, art. 1136.
184. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.38: “N’est pas davantage une
cause de nullité l’erreur qui concerne exclusivement la valeur d’une chose ou
d’une prestation ou le prix, à moins qu’elle résulte d’une erreur concernant une
caractéristique déterminante de l’objet du contrat.”
185. See TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 180, at 324: “Par suite d’une appréciation
économique erronée, le vendeur a vendu trop bon marché ou l’acheteur a acheté
trop cher.” See also B. MERCADAL, supra note 97, at para. 338: “L’erreur sur la
valeur . . . repose sur la mauvaise évaluation monétaire de la prestation de la chose
qui a conduit à lui donner une valeur minorée ou excessive.”
186. This example is adopted by the commentary on art. 89 CESL to argue
that these situations cannot constitute a change of circumstances under the provision. However, such interpretation is in line with the wording of art. 89(3) CESL
which requires the change of circumstances to occur after the conclusion of the
contract, unlike art. 1195 and Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.77 which
are silent on the issue.
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However, this mistake bears on circumstances (the increased cost of
raw materials) which are external to the act of performance of the
contract and is therefore irrelevant. 187 Nevertheless, the example
shows a typical hardship situation determined by the increase in the
cost of the manufacturer’s performance. As shown above, situations
where the party could not know about the hardship event at the moment of contract conclusion may well constitute a change of circumstances under article 1195 and draft article 5.77. Therefore, considering that in this scenario the doctrine of mistake cannot operate,
nothing prevents the manufacturer from claiming the application of
the doctrine of imprévision, provided that the other requirements envisaged by article 1195 and draft article 5.77 are met. Secondly, the
doctrine of mistake and that of imprévision may overlap in some
cases. This possibility may arise when a mistake which is legally
relevant pursuant to article 1136 or draft article 5.38, is triggered by
the ignorance of an event which may also constitute hardship, and
consequently falls on the value of performance. This situation occurs, for instance, when a buyer believes to have acquired building
land while it is not legally possible to build on it. In this case, the
mistake as to value of the land assumes relevance as it stems from a
different mistake on the “essential qualities” (article 1136) 188 or “decisive characteristic” (draft article 5.38) 189 of performance, namely
the possibility to build on it. Moreover, the impossibility to build on
the acquired land is not only the source of a mistake but also that of
a hardship situation, as it decreases the value of the counter-performance received by the buyer. Considering that the supervening
knowledge of this impossibility may constitute a change of circumstances under article 1195 and draft article 5.77, the case at issue
may be dealt with under both the doctrine of mistake and that of
imprévision. It is no doubt true that, as pointed out above, the
187. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 69.
188. TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 180, at 321.
189. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art. 5.38.
Belgian courts had already taken this position when interpreting art. 1110, see
Cour d’appel de Liège, 11 Dec. 1989, Act. dr., 1991, 210.
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doctrine of mistake is more adequate when dealing with such situations, as the mistaken party presumably prefers to render the contract null. Nevertheless, considering that a mistake produces a relative nullity190 (which can only be invoked by the mistaken party),
the party is probably in the best position to decide which remedy
suits its interests best. Therefore, in the example provided, it is conceivable that if the party decides to keep the land despite the impossibility to build on it, it will claim an adaptation of the price rather
than bringing an action for nullity.
2. Manifestations of Imprévision
The risk of a restrictive interpretation concerns, in the second
place, the events which may constitute hardship under these provisions. As shown in Section IV, while draft article 5.77 refers to
events making performance excessively onerous due to either an increase in the cost of performance or a decrease in the value of the
counter-performance, the new article 1195 merely refers to events
rendering performance excessively onerous for a party. The plain
wording of the French provision might lead courts to consider only
the first set of events, namely those rendering performance more
costly for one party. However, the ratio of new article 1195 is, in
line with the goal of contractual justice, to protect the victim of an
unforeseen circumstance from contractual imbalances. 191 Therefore,
as the decrease in the value of the counter-performance received also
determines a contractual imbalance, ruling out these situations from
the ambit of the French provision would be against the goal of contractual justice, which the new article 1195 purports to achieve.
190. Art. 1131, French Civil Code: “Les vices du consentement sont une cause
de nullité relative du contrat.”
191. Rapport au Président, supra note 7. The section of the report commenting
the introduction of imprévision provides the following: “Cette consécration, inspirée du droit comparé comme des projets d’harmonisation européens, permet de
lutter contre les déséquilibres contractuels majeurs qui surviennent en cours
d’exécution, conformément à l’objectif de justice contractuelle poursuivi par l’ordonnance.”

238

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

3. Unforeseeability of the Event
Furthermore, similar problems may arise if courts adopt a restrictive interpretation of the requirement that the change of circumstances be “unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract,” which features both the French and the Belgian provisions.
For what concerns the object of foreseeability, as shown in the previous section, a narrow interpretation would take into account only
the nature of the change of circumstances, disregarding its extent.
Consequently, even if the event is extraordinary and unprecedented
in its size, it would fall out of the scope of the provisions on imprévision just because it is in principle foreseeable. 192 However, this
would paralyse the application of article 1195 and draft article 5.77,
as the aggrieved party would not be able to benefit from the remedies envisaged in the rules, even if the worst-case scenario occurred
and the contractual equilibrium was destroyed. 193 Therefore, compliance with the goal of contractual justice calls for an extensive judicial interpretation of the requirement at issue, which considers not
only the nature of the event but also its extent. The necessity to assess the unforeseeability of the event on the basis of the specific circumstances of each case, 194 rather than in abstracto, has been
acknowledged by the courts of both civil and common law jurisdictions. As for the common law, in the Alcoa case 195 the parties had
agreed that the contract price would partially escalate in accordance
with changes in the Wholesale Price Index-Industrial Commodities
(WPI). The District Court of Pennsylvania noticed that while “over
192. CHANTEPIE & LATINA, supra note 154, at 474; Ancel, supra note 4, at
para. 81; DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 393.
193. CHANTEPIE & LATINA, supra note 154.
194. See BGE 104 II 314, 317 (1978). In relation to construction works, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal has established that, since every work carried out at fixed
flat or unit rates presents a risk, “the question as to what difficulties a contractor
should take into account in connection with the construction works depends to a
large degree on the particularities of the individual case, in particular the type and
term of the work contract.”
195. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.
Pa. 1980), Civ. A. No. 78-598.
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the previous twenty years, the Wholesale Price Index had tracked,
within a 5% variation, pertinent costs to ALCOA, a 500% variation
of costs to Index [being discussed there] must be deemed to be unforeseeable, within any meaningful sense of the word.” 196 The court
considered that there was a limit to the foreseeability of price increases and that in the case at hand the inflation rate had exceeded
this limit, being “unforeseeable in a commercial sense.” 197 On the
civil law side, 198 the Swiss Federal Tribunal held in the Jolieville
case 199 that when assessing the foreseeability of a change in the legislation the extent of the change plays a fundamental role. Indeed,
while changes of law are generally foreseeable in relation to longterm contracts, 200 “the extent (i.e., the type and essential contents)
of the change of law may not have been specifically foreseeable.” 201
The case dealt with a change in the planning and building laws that
repealed the possibility to build on a land which had been leased for
that purpose. 202 This change frustrated the purpose of the contract
and therefore decreased the value of the performance received,
196. Id. at para. 65.
197. Id. at para. 76. See L. S. Conrad, Bernina Distributors, Inc. v. Bernina
Sewing Machine Co.: New Grounds for Commercial Impracticability Based on
Currency Exchange Rates under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615, 8
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 125 (2016).
198. There are also arbitral awards based on the hardship provisions of civil
law countries which considered the extent of the change of circumstances when
determining its foreseeability. See ICC Arbitration Case no. 6281 of 26 Aug. 1989
(Steel bars case), available at https://perma.cc/CA75-GYCY, decided on the basis of Yugoslavian law, where the tribunal stated that the increase in world market
prices was “well within the customary margin” and therefore predictable; see also
ICC Arbitration Case no. 2763 of June 25, 1980, Y.B. Com. Arb. 1985, 43, decided on the basis of Libyan law, where the tribunal stated that “while the presence
of undetected submerged explosives at the bottom of a harbour which was subjected to numerous bombardments during the war, constituted a foreseeable circumstance, the importance and the quantity of explosives found went far beyond
what the parties had foreseen.”
199. BGE 127 III 302 (2001).
200. BGE 127 III 300, 305 (2001).
201. C. BRUNNER, 18 FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER GENERAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: EXEMPTION FOR NON-PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 165 (Wolters Kluwer 2008).
202. The supermarket chain (Migros) concluded a 100-year building lease
agreement with an association of landowners for the purposes of building and
operating a shopping mall on their premises.
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causing a typical hardship situation for the seller. 203 The court ruled
that the specific type and extent of the change of law was not foreseeable, since at the moment of contract conclusion nothing indicated such possibility. 204 In France, it appears that the Cour de cassation also leans towards this direction. 205 In the recent Dupire
Invicta Industrie v. Gabo case, 206 the Cour de cassation held that
there is hardship when the cost of raw materials considerably increases beyond what the parties could have foreseen. 207 In this passage, the Cour de cassation implied that there is a limit to the foreseeability of price increases, as not every price increase is per se
foreseeable but only those within this limit. Furthermore, the court
of appeal had previously considered that the aggrieved party assumed the risk that the execution of its performance would become
more expensive. 208 In the absence of an express risk allocation
within the contract, it is indeed presumed that a party assumes the
risk of the events which were foreseeable at the moment of contract
conclusion. 209 However, the Cour de cassation criticised the court
of appeal, as, in deciding that the aggrieved party assumed such risk,
it did not consider if the cost increase of raw materials amounted to
abnormal fluctuations in the relevant market. 210 The Cour de cassation rightly implied that it is not possible to assume the risk of those
events which, by their extent and impact, cannot be foreseen.

203. See PICC Official Commentary, supra note 145, at no. 2.b to art. 6.2.2,
according to which the definition of hardship expressly covers such situations.
204. BGE 127 III 302, 306 (2001).
205. Pédamon, supra note 68, at 14.
206. Cass. Com., 17 Feb. 2015, nos. 12-29.550, 13-18.956, 13-20.230.
207. See id.: “qu’il y a hardship lorsque surviennent des événements qui altèrent fondamentalement l’équilibre des prestations, notamment lorsque le coût des
matières premières se trouve considérablement augmenté, au-delà de ce qu’auraient pu prévoir les parties. . . .”
208. Reims, 4 Sep. 2012, no. 11/02698.
209. BRUNNER, supra note 201, at 157, 441.
210. Pédamon, supra note 68, at 14; Pédamon, supra note 87, at 121.
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C. The Contrast Between a Broad Interpretation of the Requirements and the Goal of Contractual Justice
If, on the one hand, those interpretations of the requirements of
article 1195 and draft article 5.77 which are excessively narrow run
counter to goal of contractual justice pursued by the rules, on the
other hand, the same can be said if these provisions or their requirements are interpreted too broadly as to cover situations which are
caused by the aggrieved party or which are independent of the transaction.
1. Hardship Situations Attributable to the Aggrieved Party
In particular, although the theory of imprévision refers to
changes of circumstances which are caused by factors external to
the contracting party, 211 the new article 1195 neither makes reference to the need for the event to be beyond the party’s control, 212
nor does it prescribe that the event must not be determined by the
party’s conduct. For what specifically concerns the second point,
draft article 5.77, unlike the French provision, requires that the
change of circumstances be not attributable to the debtor. As explained above, this means that it must not be caused by the faulty
behaviour of the aggrieved party. Despite the silence of article 1195,
several authors have suggested that a claim for imprévision under
the French provision must be denied when the event is attributable
to the actions of the debtor. 213 The same view has been upheld by
211. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 70.
212. Art. 1195 also differs from art. 1218 of the French Civil Code, on force
majeure, which prescribes that the event must be beyond the control of the debtor.
As it has been noted, this notion is broader than fault: art. 1218 does not apply if
the situation is within the party’s sphere of control, even if the event was not
caused by the party’s fault. Conversely, it seems that Belgian Draft of 2019, supra
note 6, art. 5.77 would apply even when the event is within the control of the
aggrieved party (e.g., acts of employees), as long as it was not caused by its faulty
behaviour (e.g., employer negligence).
213. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 391; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 180,
at 716; MERCADAL, supra note 97, at para. 615, note that this approach is already
followed by the Conseil d’État when addressing cases of imprévision.
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the Italian Supreme Court, even though article 1467 of the Italian
Civil Code does not contain such requirement. 214 However, French
courts are highly unlikely to protect self-induced hardship, as this
would mean protecting incompetent or careless parties. Indeed, if
article 1195 were to be interpreted as to cover situations of self-induced hardship, the goal of contractual justice pursued by the reform
would hardly be accomplished. The other party would run the risk
to bear further costs resulting from the possible adaptation of the
contract, even when the event making the execution excessively onerous occurred due to a delay in the performance of the contract by
the aggrieved party. 215 In doing so, article 1195 would allow dishonest contracting parties to escape the harmful consequences of their
own faults, unfairly placing the other parties in a disadvantaged position. 216
2. Excessive Onerousness of the Performance Measured
Against the Subjective Conditions of the Aggrieved Party
Moreover, there is the risk that French and Belgian courts might
interpret the excessive onerousness requirement too extensively. It
is true that a case-by-case evaluation is to be preferred to a universal
and mathematical threshold. 217 Indeed, assessing the excessive onerousness against a merely numeric benchmark, without taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the contract, constitutes a
strict application of the principle pacta sunt servanda, which clashes
with the goal of contractual justice. However, it is debated how deep
this evaluation in concreto should be.
In determining when the change of circumstances makes performance of the contract excessively onerous, courts will have to decide whether to interpret this condition objectively, measuring the
214. Corte di Cassazione, section II, 23 Feb. 2001, n. 2661.
215. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 391.
216. Id.
217. D. Girsberger & P. Zapolskis, Fundamental Alteration of the Contractual
Equilibrium under Hardship Exemption, 19 JURISPRUDENCIJA 129 (2012).
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performance of the aggrieved party against the counter-performance, or subjectively, against the aggrieved party’s conditions.218
In particular, it is controversial whether article 1195 and draft article
5.77 allow courts to consider the impact of the change of circumstances on the financial situation of the party, in order to conclude
that the event amounts to hardship. If the latter approach were to be
adopted, French and Belgian courts might find imprévision even
when the supervening event creates no significant disproportion between the parties’ performances, and yet performing the contract
would result in the financial ruin of the party claiming hardship.
As shown in section IV, the wording of draft article 5.77 suggests that courts might take into account the aggrieved party’s personal situation, as it refers to a change of circumstances which
makes the execution of the contract excessively onerous in a way
that “no one may reasonably demand it.” As for article 1195, while
many authors believe that the objective approach should prevail, 219
others hold that French courts might well take into account the personal conditions of the aggrieved party 220 or are ultimately unsure
about the right approach as it is considered a legal policy decision. 221
As seen above, the French and Belgian legislators have made an express legal policy choice with regard to the provisions on imprévision, as they consider them an expression of the overall goal of
contractual justice pursued by the reforms. Consequently, courts
should lean towards the objective approach, disregarding the financial situation of the party. The goal of contractual justice is to avoid
contractual imbalances, namely a disproportion between the obligations stemming from the contract. Conversely, the subjective approach considers the imbalance between the parties rather than their
performances, and it analyses factors which are external to the
218. TERRÉ ET AL., supra note180, at 717.
219. Id.; CHÉNEDÉ, supra note 167, at 118; Stoffel-Munck, supra note 135, at
33; J. S. Borghetti, La force obligatoire des contrats, DR. ET PATR. 68 (2016); P.
MALAURIE ET AL., DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS 764 (L.G.D.J./Lextenso 2016).
220. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 78; MERCADAL, supra note 97, at para. 613.
221. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 399.
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contract. This has the pathological effect of discriminating between
commercial parties based on their financial situation: on the one
hand, the application of article 1195 and draft article 5.77 would be
prevented to a successful company with high profits, just because it
would be able to absorb the exceptional costs generated by the loss
of the single transaction; on the other hand, a company close to financial ruin would easily meet the threshold for the excessive onerousness even if, for instance, it makes a loss due to an ordinary price
increase. 222 When the excessiveness is examined with regard to the
transaction alone, the remedy of adaptation is meant to correct contractual injustice; when it is examined in relation to the aggrieved
party’s economic situation, adaptation becomes a grace mechanism. 223 Hardship situations must be exceptional, because they constitute a derogation from the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Therefore, they cannot encompass the state of indebtedness of the
aggrieved party, as anything could amount to hardship for the debtor
with a sensitive financial situation. This conclusion shall not be hindered by the wording of draft article 5.77 which defines contract
execution as excessively onerous when “no one may reasonably demand it.” The reasonableness test must be conducted with regard to
the exceptional increase in the cost of performance or decrease in
the value of the counter-performance, rather than the personal conditions of the party. Furthermore, in most cases the sensitive financial situation of the party is the result of bad business management.
Consequently, the economic condition of the aggrieved party cannot
be taken into account also because, as shown above, the change of
circumstances must not be attributable to the debtor.
Nevertheless, by way of derogation from the proposed objective
interpretation, the economic condition of the aggrieved party may
indirectly assume some relevance in long-term agreements. Parties
enter into long-term agreements with the aim of building up and
222. Stoffel-Munck, supra note 147, at 58-59.
223. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 399.
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maintaining “for several years (usually around 20-25) a relationship
that satisfies the reciprocal interests and expectations.” 224 They invest significant resources in planning a commercial relationship on
which they wish to be able to rely for long.225 Consequently, in determining what makes performance of the parties excessively onerous, courts should first look at what risks the parties have assumed
at the moment of contract conclusion, 226 as they might have implicitly ruled out the possibility of financial ruin. Regarding agreements
for a particular long term, such as joint ventures or franchising contracts, parties might express the desire to enter into a mutually beneficial relationship and impliedly expect a certain outcome or profit
rate from the whole operation. Such contracts might be affected by
a change of circumstances, making performance significantly more
onerous, which causes the aggrieved party’s financial ruin even
though the required threshold for hardship is not met. 227 An example
of that situation is a supervening event which is not limited to a short
period of time, causing the aggrieved party to bear an annual loss.
While the single loss is per se sustainable, this prolonged situation
might expose the aggrieved party, whose financial situation was
sound when parties entered into the agreement, to an impeding financial ruin. 228 Moreover, if this loss could have been foreseen, the
length of the hardship situation may not have been specifically foreseeable. Although in long-term contracts bad years may be offset by
good years, 229 the same loss repeated over the years makes this impossible. Indeed, the impending commercial ruin of the aggrieved
party frustrates the purpose of the contract as it prevents the parties
224. P. FERRARIO, THE ADAPTATION OF LONG-TERM GAS SALE AGREEMENTS
BY ARBITRATORS 72 (Wolters Kluwer 2017).

225. Id. at 73.
226. BRUNNER, supra note 201, at 240-241, 432.
227. Id. at 435. The financial impact on the obligor may become disastrous,
especially when the aggrieved party is a relatively small company for which the
affected contract represents a significant part of its revenues.
228. It is conceivable that the repeated loss might hinder the aggrieved party
from accessing financial credit, the lack of which eventually leads to its bankruptcy.
229. BGE 47 II 440, 458 (1921).
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from reversing the consequences of the hardship situation in the future, so as to achieve in the long-term the minimum expected outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION
The codification of imprévision in France and its codification
attempt in Belgium are part of a larger revitalization of the law of
contracts, aimed at attracting foreign investors through the creation
of a business-friendly legal environment which is able to adapt to
the new social and economic challenges. For this outcome to be
achieved, it is paramount that contractual parties know under which
circumstances they can successfully claim adaptation or termination
of their agreements. However, the approach of the French and Belgian legislators to adopt general legal propositions, without definitions or a detailed regulation of the conditions triggering the application of article 1195 and draft article 5.77, leaves itself open to several questions of interpretation and criticism. In particular, the wide
margins of appreciation given to courts might create uncertainty
among contractual parties, confronted with the risk of different judicial interpretations of the same requirements for imprévision.
It is not unusual in continental legal systems for courts to be
given tremendous leeway in interpreting codified provisions. Nevertheless, it appears appropriate, in order not to frustrate the expectations of contractual parties and to give the legal system some sort
of stability, that courts carry out their hermeneutical activity in a
manner consistent with the three main goals of the French and Belgian reforms: that is, to have a law which is modern, certain and fair.
According to the proposed solution, to strike a balance between
said goals, article 1195 and draft article 5.77 should apply: (1) as for
the time of the change of circumstances, also to events occurring
before the conclusion of the contract, when the parties learn about
their existence only after its conclusion; (2) as for the manifestations
of imprévision, also to situations in which performance becomes
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excessively onerous due to a decrease in the value of the counterperformance received; (3) as for the unforeseeability of the event, to
changes of circumstances which are unforeseeable in their extent,
rather than their nature; (4) as for the excessive onerousness of the
performance, to situations where there is an excessive imbalance between the contractual performances and not between the subjective
conditions of the parties (which can be considered only by way of
exception); (5) as for the attributability of the change of circumstances, only to situations where the hardship event has not been
caused by the actions of the aggrieved party. In particular, such interpretation is not against legal certainty (as conceived by European
countries), as the inclusion of these situations is not contrary to the
wording of the norms. Moreover, it conforms with the goal of modernisation, as these solutions have been adopted by modern projects
for the harmonisation of contract law. Finally, these solutions must
be preferred also on grounds of contractual justice, as they allow
courts to better preserve the contractual balance.
The judicial application of the rules at issue will be paramount
in order to end the doctrinal debate surrounding the requirements for
imprévision. Seeing how the French and Belgian reforms emerged
from a context of historical rejection of the doctrine of imprévision,
it will be interesting to analyse how French and, if ever, Belgian
courts will make use for the first time in their history of the power
to revise contracts in the event of unforeseeable circumstances. In
particular, whether the long-standing judicial tradition to protect the
principle of pacta sunt servanda will lead to a restrictive interpretation of such requirements or whether courts, taking into account the
desire of the legislators to pursue contractual justice, will avoid that
situations of contractual imbalance evade the scope of the rules at
issue, however, without excessively broadening the boundaries of
judicial intervention into contractual affairs.

